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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background of the Problem 
The American college, unlike its European prototype, has not been 
organized on the principle that every matter involving educational 
policy is to be decided by and with the consent of the faculty. In 
1636 when Harvard College was established, the responsibility for con-
ducting the college was assigned to a lay board and the chief adminis-
trative officer rather than a body of self governing scholars. The 
board of trustees was granted complete control of its college by char-
ter. It exercised this control by dealing directly with the recruit-
ment of staff, the designing of curriculum, the selection of textbooks, 
the appointment of the President, establishing rules and regulations. 
It was free to hire, fire, promote, or demote any employee.1 The 
methods of governance in other universities which were established in 
the 17th and 18th Centuries were the same as Harvard. Exceptional in-
stances of faculty leadership within an institution existed at Yale and 
Wisconsin, but even here real power tended to center in a small group 
of senior professors rather than in the instructional staff .2 
However, the expansion of universities and colleges, the increas-
ing number of students and faculty, the fast development of industry, 
the rise of state supported institutions, particularly in response to 
1 
the provision of the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890, the rise of nat-
ural science, perhaps most importantly, the elective system and expan-
sion of curriculum which was initiated by Harvard, and quickly spread 
to other universities and colleges, caused the board of trustees to 
abdicate more of their power to more qualified people such as presi-
dents and professors.3 This is evident in Morris' statement which 
describes the faculty's authority in 1908 as follows: 11 In the govern-
ance of Yale College the faculty legislates, the president concurs, 
and the corporation ratifies. 11 4 
Another significant development since the turn of the twentieth 
century which gave momentum to the role of faculty in governance has 
been the rise of the doctrine of academic freedom. Particularly, the 
doctrine began to gain momentum by the founding of the Association of 
American University Professors (AAUP) in 1915 and its committee on 
academic freedom and tenure in 1940. In more concrete terms, the AAUP 
envisages the faculty as participating in general educational policy, 
long range planning, allocation of physical resources, and the selec-
tion of key administrative resources. It also adds that the faculty 
should exercise primary responsibility for curriculum, subject matter 
and methods of instruction, research, and those aspects of student 
life relating to the educational process.5 
However, the method of governance has not been practiced the same 
in all universities and colleges. There are some universities which 
provide more opportunities for faculties to participate in the govern-
ance than others.6 In other words, at one extreme are those highly 
autocratic institutions where the faculties are treated as little more 
than employees of an industrial enterprise. It is not uncommon at 
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such institutions for decisions on faculty status to be rendered by 
the administration without prior consultation with the individual or 
the members of the affected department. Department chairpersons are 
considered to be "supervisors" of the faculty rank-and-file and are 
appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the administration. Tenure, 
if such an institution has a tenure system at all worthy of the name, 
is granted by the administration without collegial judgment, and fac-
ulty committees, if they exist, are purely advisory to an administra-
tive appointing authority. At the other end of the governance spec-
trum there are a number of institutions in which the faculty plays a 
significant, if not a determinative, role in the development of insti-
tutional policy. These are commonly regarded as the academically 
"better" institutions.? 
There is little doubt that faculty in the former group, repre-
sented most obviously in the community colleges, are apt to feel that 
they have a marginal status in academic life. Professor Lewis B. 
Mayhew of Stanford University has commented that this feeling produces 
"anxiety, punitiveness, rage, and a search for scapegoats. 11 8 
How to enable faculty to participate in academic decision-making 
is one of the major questions facing higher education. Two major 
options are now competing for support. One is collective negotia-
tions, and the other is shared governance.9 The first model of col-
lective negotiations, as a form of governance, is a recent phenomenon 
in American higher education. It calls for recognizing faculty and 
trustees as separately organized interest groups. These groups would 
negotiate issues relating to goals and methods, and the administration 
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or an outside party would mediate in cases of conflict.10 Donald 
Wallett notes, 
The process of negotiations assumes parity of legal standing, 
between the parties and some bargaining power on both sides. 
Bilateral determination of the terms and conditions of 
employment through the process of collective negotiations 
means that neither party should have the ability to impose. 
its will on the others.11 
To some extent this model is now evolving through pressures from 
the American Association of University Professors, the National Educa-
tion Association, and the American Federation of Teachers. 
The second model of shared governance is based on the premise 
that faculty members are professionals, that they constitute a group 
of practitioners whose skills are so highly specialized that only they 
are competent to decide who may be permitted to be part of the group 
and to evaluate each member's performance. As Joseph Garbarino has 
concisely put it, "The essence of professionalism is autonomy and 
self-regulation of the conditions under which the profession is car-
ried on, in return for which the professional concepts of a form 
fiduciary responsibility toward his or her clients. 11 12 The most 
authoritative outline of the shared governance is the Statement on 
Governance of Colleges and Universities, drafted jointly in 1966 by 
the American Association of University Professors, the American Coun-
cil on Education, and the Association of Governing Boards of Univer-
sities and Colleges. It proposed: 
The faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental 
areas as curriculum; subject matter; methods of instruc-
tions; research; those aspects of student life which relate 
to the educational process; faculty status including ap-
pointments, reappointments, decisions not to reappoint, 
promotions, the granting of tenure, and dismissal. The 
governing board and president should, on questions of fac-
ulty status, as in other matters where the faculty has 
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primary responsibility, concur with the faculty judgment 
except in rare instances and for compeling reasons which 
should be stated in detail .13 
The joint statement also suggested that faculty representatives 
should be selected by the faculty according to procedures determined 
by the faculty. The agencies may consist of meetings of all faculty 
members of a department, school, college, division, or university sys-
tern, or may take the fonn of faculty-elected senate or council for 
large divisions of institutions as a whole.14 
Increasingly, faculty are electing the model of bargaining as a 
decision-making process in higher education as a result of some defi-
ciencies attached to faculty governance groups. First of all, faculty 
governance groups lack funds needed to pursue an aggressive campaign 
of faculty representation. Administrators provide the funds, and they 
naturally do not wish to subsidize a strong employee representation 
system. Also they are inclined to regulate the internal affairs of 
faculty governance groups. Secondly, the faculty governance groups, 
especially in state and junior colleges, are not likely to have the 
negotiating, accounting, legal, and other expertise needed for effec-
tive representation. Thirdly, there is no faculty appeal from an 
adverse decision by the administrators. Finally, faculty governance 
groups usually lack accountability to their faculty.15 
For years the lack of real decision-making power by faculty gov-
ernance groups over economic issues in general and over personnel 
policy at public two-year institutions has caused many academicians to 
consider faculty governance groups as ineffective. In 1969 the 
Carnegie Survey asked respondents to indicate the effectiveness of 
their senates; 60 percent of the 60,000 respondents answered "fair" 
5 
or 11 poor11 .l6 In Hodgkinson 1 s study of 688 broad-based senates, campus 
presidents most frequently rated the influence of the senate in campus 
affairs as "advisory" and the second most frequent role as having "no 
responsibility at all. 11 17 Hodgkinson also found that instead of 
"shared governance" the presidents stressed "the possibility of 
access" to decision-making channels.18 
In 1967 another statement about campus governance appeared--the 
report of the Task Force on Faculty Representation and Academic Nego-
tiations of the American Association for Higher Education. The task 
force reported that faculty discontent had become evident in many in-
stitutions, especially in public junior colleges and in the emerging 
four year teacher colleges and certain state universities. The report 
identified the principle source of this discontent as the non-recogni-
tion or non-accomodation of a faculty desire to participate in poli-
cies affecting the professional status and performance of faculties.19 
It further proposed: 
1 Formal bargaining• relationship between the faculty and 
the administration are most likely to develop if the 
administration has failed to establish or support effec-
tive internal organization for faculty representation.20 
Yet another extensive document about campus governance appeared 
in 1973--the report of the Carnegie Commission on Governance of Higher 
Education. The report made clear that it was defining governance as 
"the structures and processes of decision making." On the subject of 
faculty power and collective bargaining the Carnegie Comission recoo1-
mended: 
Faculties be granted the •general level of authority• 
proposed by the American Association of University 
Professors •••• The commision proposed the enactment 
of state laws to permit faculty members in public 
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institutions to engage in collective bargaining if they 
desire to do so.21 
As of June 20, 1980, approximately 681 campuses had chosen col-
lective bargaining agents in 24 states. Of these, 428 were two-year 
campuses.22 In addition, there were 242 teachers' strikes against 
schools and colleges during 1979-80, according to a survey of the 
affiliates of the AAUP, the AFT, and the NEA. The survey conducted 
by the NEA, found there were strikes in 23 states in 1979-80, called 
by 201 affiliates of the NEA, 34 locals of the AFT, and 7 chapters of 
the AAUP.23 
Malcom Scrully, former editor of the Chronicle of Higher Educa-
tion, as many others, writes, " ••• believe academic professionals 
should organize, because unlike other professions, they are employed 
by institutions. Their goals and those of the institution may some-
times differ. 11 24 
The trend toward unionization was fostered in the late 1960's and 
early 1970's possibly in response to the reaction to the student riots 
of the 1960's. Students claimed a large role in governance and states 
intruded more heavily into the running of colleges and universities, 
especially in the financial sector. Faculties sought to organize 
countervailing power blocks, often in the form of unions.25 The pri-
mary concern had been economic matters. However, today unions have 
extended their areas of jurisdictions and they cover the following 
areas: 
1. Job security, including traditional academic personnel mat-
ters, such as procedures for appointments, promotion, and granting 
tenure, layoffs, and retrenchment. 
7 
2. Governance, including the c001peting rights of the faculty 
governance groups. 
3. Salaries, fringe benefits, and other types of economic 
compensation. 
They also bargain over many other issues involving working conditions, 
including class size, teaching load, office space, and parking priv-
ileges.26 
The attitudes of faculty toward collective negotiations in higher 
education have been considered an important factor in the application 
of the trade union model to institutions of higher education. Many 
studies have been conducted to detennine the attitudes of faculty to-
ward collective negotiations in community colleges and senior insti-
tutions. These studies have revealed a wide variety of descriptive 
data about faculty attitudes and about the types of faculty that are 
most likely to seek out collective negotiations.27 In addition, Smart 
and Rogers' research has indicated that there are significantly 
different factors affecting collective negotiations in community 
colleges.28 
However, it was the purpose of this study to expand upon this 
base of knowledge by collecting, analyzing, and interpreting the atti-
tudes of community junior college faculty members toward collective 
negotiations in relation to their perceptions of participation in aca-
demic decision-making. Further, the study attempted to determine if 
certain personal, demographic, and institutional characteristics could 
be statistically significant predictors of attitudes toward collective 
negotiations. 
8 
Statement of the Problem 
The problem of this research is to investigate the relationship 
between community junior college faculty members' perceptions of their 
participation in academic decision-making and attitudes toward collec-
tive negotiations. 
More specifically, this study seeks answers to the following 
questions: 
1. What is the general attitude orientation of community junior 
college faculty members toward collective negotiations? 
2. Are there statistically significant differences between 
faculty member's attitudes toward collective negotiations and their 
perceptions of participation in academic decision-making? 
3. Are there statistically significant differences in attitudes 
toward collective negotiations among the selected individual colleges? 
4. Are there statistically significant differences in attitudes 
toward collective negotiations between state supported and private 
community junior colleges? 
5. Are there statistically significant relationships between the 
selected demographic and career characteristics of age, sex, religion, 
political preference, satisfaction with community junior college 
teaching, tenure status, degree, rank, teaching curriculum, academic 
field, and faculty members' attitude toward collective negotiations. 
Need for the Study 
Collective negotiations in community junior colleges has spread 
throughout the country at a steady pace since 1966 when the first 
9 
community college strike occurred in Michigan.29 As of June 20, 1980, 
faculty on more than 681 campuses have elected collective bargaining 
agents in 24 states, of which 428 are community junior colleges.30 
These 428 colleges represent almost two-thirds of all post secondary 
institutions under contracts. Increasingly, bills are being intro-
duced into state legislatures to enable collective negotiations in 
higher education. The statutory law to bargain collectively seems to 
be an impetus to collective negotiations. It could be agreed that 
competition between the American Federation of Teachers, the National 
Education Association, and the American Association of University 
Professors to represent faculty as bargaining agents will increase the 
utilization of collective negotiations by faculty members. 
The most commonly mentioned cause for the greater spread of col-
1 ective negotiations in the community junior colleges than in senior 
institutions is the low status of collegiality of faculty participa-
tion in governance.31 Community colleges do not enjoy the same degree 
of democratic governance as their counterparts in higher education. 
If it is possible to generalize, the power of governance is still con-
centrated in the community-college boards and the presidents. Cen-
tralization of power in the administration seems to be a hangover from 
public-school administration where the boards and administrators hdd 
almost total power over the faculty. Even as community colleges have 
emancipated themselves from public school districts, the traditions of 
autocratic control continues to prevail.32 
Social theory indicates that only through organized groups can 
the individual have an impact on policies and practices which 
will improve his self-identity and status. Collective bargaining, 
10 
therefore, is an effective means by which the teacher, his goals, and 
his professional expectations can be integrated with the institutions. 
By its very nature it creates dynamic interaction between administra-
tor and teacher, each of whom is often considered sovereign in his own 
sphere. Although this territoriality can lead to institutional frag-
mentation and loss of a holistic perspective, negotiations bring the 
parties together, providing a matrix for promise and consensus. Seen 
as mutual problem solving, negotiation tends to reduce, rather than 
create conflicts.33 
Because there are indications that collective negotiations may 
occur in states where faculty members do not presently have statutory 
law to negotiate collectively, it was thought desirable to collect and 
analyze empirical data concerning the attitudes of these community 
college faculty toward collective negotiations. Data such as this 
will be of value to faculty, administrators, governing boards, public 
officials, and students of collective negotiations and higher educa-
tion. 
Research Nul 1 Hypotheses 
1. There are no statistically significant differences with 
regard to attitudes toward collective negotiations on the part of 
individuals classified as decisionally deprived, saturated, or at 
equilibrium. 
2. There are no statistically significant differences in atti-
tudes toward collective negotiations between state supported and pri-
vate community junior colleges. 
11 
3. There are no statistically significant differences in atti-
tudes toward collective negotiations among the selected individual 
colleges. 
4. There are no statistically significant relationships between 
the selected demographic and career characteristics of age, sex, 
religion, political preference, satisfaction with junior college 
teaching, tenure status, degree, rank, teaching curriculum, academic 
field, and faculty members• attitudes toward collective negotiations. 
Definition of Terms 
1. Attitudes - "An attitude is a personal disposition common to 
individuals but possessed to different degrees, which impels them to 
react to objects, situations, or propositions in a way that can be 
called favorable and unfavorable. 11 34 
2. Collective negotiations - "A process in which conditions of 
employment are determined by agreement between representatives of 
an organized group of employees on the one hand, and one or more 
employers on the other. 11 35 
3. Community junior college - For the purposes of this study 
is an institution of higher education offering two years of post-
secondary education in Arkansas, Missouri, North Dakota, and Oklahoma. 
4. Decisional deprivation - "Current rate of participation less 
than desired rate of participation in academic decision-making. 11 36 
5. Decisional Equilibrium - "Current rate of participation equal 
to desired rate of participation in academic decision-making. 11 37 
6. Decision-making - Decision-making is composed of four 
phases: (1) intelligence activity: searching the environment for 
12 
conditions calling for decision; (2) design activity: investigating, 
developing, and analyzing possible courses of action take place; (3) 
choice activity: selecting a particular course of action from those 
available; (4) implementation: initiating the plan of action for the 
implementation of the decision.38 
7. Decisional-participation - "The discrepancy between a faculty 
member 1 s current and desired rates of participation in academic 
decision-making. 11 39 
8. Decisional saturation - "Current rate of participation more 
than desired rate of participation in academic decision-making. 11 40 
9. Full-time faculty member - is an instructor who teaches a 
full load as detennined by the institution in which he is employed 
and receive renumeration commensurate to the position. 
10. Perception - is a mental image which comes through physical 
sensation, and is interpreted in the light of experience. 
Limitations of the Study 
1. The study was limited to a sample of the full-time faculty 
members in state-supported community junior colleges in Arkansas, 
Missouri, North Dakota, and Oklahoma. 
2. The study was limited to full-time faculty members in private 
community junior college in Oklahoma. 
3. The results of the study are limited to the general time 
period in which the study was conducted. 
4. The results of the study can be generalized only to similar 
populations. 
13 
5. The results of the study are interpretable only as descrip-
tions of the statistical relationship between selected measurements 
of these variables. The results are not measures of causal relation-
ships between the research variables. 
14 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH 
This chapter presents a synopsis of the pertinent material rela-
ted to investigation. However, this does not imply that the factors 
included comprise an exhaustive list. 
Faculty Collective Negotiations in 
Higher Education 
In sorting out and clarifying the factors important to the move-
ment of faculty in establishing collective negotiations, it is useful 
to distinguish three basic categories of variables affecting job sat-
isfaction and acceptance of unionization: (1) variables external to 
institutions of higher education which have a direct impact on their 
operation; (2) organizational characteristics of the institutions 
themselves; and (3) characteristics describing faculty and adminis-
trators. 
External Factors 
Among the most frequently mentioned external factors are the 
existence of enabling legislation which allow public employees and 
specifically college and university faculty to bargain collectively, 
market factors, and the organizational rivalries of the AAUP, the NEA, 
and the AFT. 
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Legislation 
Collective bargaining became a leading system of controlling the 
employment relationship in the American economy in 1935 when Congress 
passed the National Labor Relations Act, known as the Wagner Act.l 
For the first three decades following the passage of the Wagner Act, 
the law did not encourage faculty collective bargaining; indeed, in 
large measure it prohibited such activity. Faculty members at public 
institutions were specifically excluded from the coverage of the fed-
eral labor relations statutes and nowhere did state laws authorize 
them to bargain.2 The employees of private colleges and universities 
were not expressly denied the right to bargain under the Wagner Act, 
but the National Labor Relations Board regularly declined to extend 
its jurisdiction to nonprofit organizations.3 
In 1962 President John F. Kennedy, by executive order, introduced 
a limited system of representation for federal employees, and in June, 
1970, the National Labor Relations Board asserted jurisdiction over 
private colleges and universities. In a class case involving Cornell 
University, the NLRB ruled that all such institutions with a gross 
operating revenue of not less than $1,000,000 would fall under its 
jurisdiction.4 
Cornell had asked the NLRB to reconsider its earlier ruling of 
almost twenty years and accept jurisdiction of a case involving cer-
tain of its non-academic employees, perferring to deal with the fed-
eral agency rather than with state authorities under New York state's 
public employee bargaining legislation known as the Taylor Act. The 
NLRB determined in the Cornell case that it had statutory authority 
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to supervise collective bargaining for private institutions and 
launched such an undertaking.5 
However, since education is a function basically of the state, 
while the degree of encouragement among the states varies greatly, 
permissive state legislation is the key explanation for the burst of 
academic unionism in the late 1960's and early 1970's. As Garbarino 
points out, about 90 percent of the organized institutions are located 
in states with the strongest legislation.6 
State legislation supporting the right of faculties to negotiate 
falls into two broad categories which can be denoted for convenience 
as meet-and-confer and as collective bargaining laws. Typical meet-
and-confer-1 aws recognize the employees 1 right to organize and require 
employers to deal with employee organizations on a wide variety of 
matters but limit this requirement to "meeting and conferring." Usu-
ally they provide no administrative machinery for deciding represen-
tation questions, no exclusive bargaining rights, and no requirement 
that employers bargain collective or sign written contracts. Perhaps 
most importantly~ no impasse procedure is provided if agreement is not 
achieved. Collective bargaining laws include all or most of these 
omitted features and contain a requirement to bargain collectively 
"in good faith, 11 a term that has acquired impressive legal meaning in 
private-section bargaining over the years. The c~tegory into which 
an individual law falls is not always clear, but approximately one-
fifth of the state statutes are meet-and-confer laws.7 
As of January, 1980, 24 states had passed enabling legislations 
on collective bargaining for public postsecondary education employees 
on matters of wages, hours, and working conditions.8 The recent 
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slowdown of the growth of faculty bargaining is a reflection of the 
fact that most of the public institutions in states with legislations 
are organized.9 In states without legislation, there have been few 
administrations willing to permit elections for a faculty bargaining 
agent without a statutory requirement. The most notable examples of 
this position are institutions in Wisconsin, California, and Washing-
tion. Administrations in Arizona, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, and 
Ohio have been less reluctant to proceed to bargaining without statu-
tory authority.IO 
Market Factors 
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The most common reason for faculty interest in collective bar-
gaining cited in recent literature is the dissatisfaction with compen-
sation. The growth of higher education in the 1960's created an aura 
of affluence on campuses. The growth in the college-age population, 
the continued growth in the proportion of the relevant age group, the 
international scientific and technological competition touched off by 
the successful soviet satellite launching in 1958, and the competition 
among states to provide university centers to facilitate the growth 
of science-based industry combined to expand university budget and 
because of relative shortage of experienced faculty to expand salaries 
and prerequisites. 
By the end of the 1960's, however, for most disciplines the aca-
demic market has ended as a result of decreases in the rate of enroll-
ment growth and of the reduction in financial support by federal and 
state authorities. The 1970's have brought what the Carnegie Commis-
sion calls the ''new depression in higher education."11 
In 1967, when the state colleges of California first were con-
sidering collective bargaining, their facultie~ were asked by the 
American Association of University Professors to state the major prob-
1 em confronting them. The answer given was: "Undoubtedly the crisis 
precipitated by Governor Reagan's proposed budget cuts. 11 12 Cutbacks 
also have been identified as a major cause of faculty dissatisfaction 
at Albion13 and Youngstown State University.14 Feuille and Blandin 
also indicated that a state budget squeeze accounted for the fact that 
the greatest area of dissatisfaction for the Unviersity of Oregon fac-
ulty was the state's financial support of the University.15 In 1971, 
the AAUP's Committee noted that the "single greatest cause of re-
quests from faculty members for assistance by the association during 
1970 has been dismissal or non-renewal on grounds of financial exi-
gency. u 16 
The renumeration system in higher education has been responsible 
for feelings that compensation is inadequate. The salary system pro-
vides for increased salary with an increase of rank. While higher 
salaries may prevail at the higher ranks composed of the fewest per-
sonnel, the lower-ranked majority do not enjoy the same benefits.17 
Faculties generally have had little to say about their compensa-
tion levels. A survey of 1,141 colleges and universities granting the 
B.A. degree of high education revealed that only 20% of those insti-
tutions could document conferring with faculty over compensation.18 
Another source of discontent among professors, especially in the 
two-year colleges, is the belief that other professions are improving 
their economic position at a faster rate than their own. Recognition 
that colleagues in other institutions of higher education have gained 
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rewards fonn the collective negotiations process becomes a contribu-
ting factor. The wage structure at the City University of New York 
(CUNY), for example, has been widely cited.19 
Union Competition 
Since by definition collective bargaining implies two represen-
tative groups meeting together to offer proposals and counterproposals 
to reach agreement, a collective bargaining agency is necessary in 
this process. Three of the five possible candidates for bargaining 
agent are well known national organizations, each of which has been 
trying to carve out for itself a significant share of the business in 
this field. They are the American Federation of Teachers, the Ameri-
can Association of University Professors, and the National Education 
Association.20 
The organizational campaigns of the NEA, the AFT, and the AAUP 
are stimulating the growth of unionization in higher education. Eco-
nomically hard-pressed faculty are naturally impressed with the poten-
tial pressure these national organizations can place on campus admin-
istration through collective bargaining and on legislatures through 
lobbying. For example, after an indepth study at the University of 
Massachusetts in 1973, Semas noted that "it is unlikely that unease 
would have been translated into a collective bargaining election •• 
If MTA (Massachusetts Teacher Association, the State affiliate of the 
NEA) organizers had not come on to the campus. 11 21 
Although each organization had certain handicaps to overcome in 
entering this new area of labor-management relations, they were avail-
able and active from the start as candidates for faculty bargaining 
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agents.. They have provided the aggressive organizing effort with out 
which it is unlikely that many faculties would have reached the stage 
of full involvement in collective bargaining with their governing 
boards. Each of three representatives will be discussed in turn. 
American Federation of Teachers. AFT was founded in 1916, when 
several local teachers unions in the Chicago area were granted a 
charter by the American Federation of Labor. In 1919 the AFT became 
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a chartered affiliate of the American Federation of Labor and by 1935 
it claimed a membership of over 13,000. AFT membership grew to nearly 
30,000 in 1939, 246,747 in 1971, and by 1979 the association's member-
ship reached a total of approximately 400,000. About 206 two-year 
and four-year colleges are organized with this unit.22 
The decade of the 1960's marked the most dramatic rise in teacher 
militancy. During the early 1960's the AFT won several representative 
elections, the most famous being in New York City, where the United 
Federation of Teachers, AFT Local No. 2, led a successful strike and 
won recognition as the bargaining agent for the teachers of New York 
City. After this victory, AFT became aggressive in urging collective 
bargaining on public school teachers throughout the country. 
As early as the 1930's, AFT established a few locals for profes-
sors at urban institutions. The purpose was to identify professors 
with the American Labor Movement for the long-run benefits that might 
accrue to both sides, rather than the immediate one of engaging in 
collective bargaining.23 It gained its foothold in higher education 
as a labor organization before either NEA or AAUP. In the middle and 
late 1960's and early 1970's more than two hundred local campuses 
chapters were established, and the early reluctance of faculty mem-
bers, some of whom questionned whether it was professional to join a 
union, seem to have been overcome. In 1966 a full-time college and 
university department was officially established, and by the end of 
1974 AFT was the agent for fifty-eight institutions and by June, 1980, 
for 242 campuses.24 
The AFT adopts an adversary blue-collar approach to bargaining, 
and in university policies, tends to be associated with radical cau-
ses. The AFT is egalitarian rather than meritocratic, arguing that a 
merit system cannot work without the injection of personal bias. The 
federation views the faculty members as an employee for whom others 
make the key decisions, not as a self-governing individual. As a 
result, it has little appeal to the more conservative and senior 
faculty. The AFT locals have always taken a forthright adversary 
position in their bargaining relationships, stressing conflict of 
interests, exclusion of supervisors, a broad membership base, formal 
contracts, third-part resolution of disputes, and acceptance of the 
strike as the ultimate form of sanction.25 
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National Education Association. NEA is the oldest of the three 
organizations. It traces its origins back to the National Teachers 
Association, which was founded in 1857 when ten states teachers asso-
ciations joined forces in establishing a national organization which 
they hoped would 11 elevate the character and advance the interests of 
the profession of teaching, and promote the cause of popular education 
in the United States.26 Its membership did not reach 10,000 until 
1918, when reportedly it enrolled only 5 precent of the nations' 
public school teachers. Thereafter, it grew more rapidly, particu-
larly in recent decades. The NEA Handbook 1971-72 put its membership 
at 1,103,485 and memberships in its state affiliates at 1,726,751; 
affiliated local associations numbered 8,950. 
The NEA developed a minor interest in higher education, princi-
pally because of teacher-training programs was a function of higher 
education. This interest developed through a series of organizational 
arrangements, leading ultimately to the fonnation of the American 
Association for Higher Education. During the 1960 1 s, the relationship 
between AAHE and NEA became increasingly troubled. AAHE vigorously 
opposed collective bargaining in higher education, whereas NEA was 
deciding to challenge AFT as the means through which public school 
teachers could utilize collective bargaining in a more aggressive 
attempt to improve their conditions of employement. In 1968, AAHE 
voted to drop its departmental status with NEA and to become an "asso-
ciated organization." For all practical purposes, AAHE thereby became 
an independent agency.27 
The NEA for most of its existence since its foundation has seen 
itself as a professional institute for teachers in a role somewhat 
analogous to the one filled by the AAUP in higher education. In the 
1960 1 s, however, largely as a result of competition from the American 
Federation of Teachers, the NEA increasingly moved to become a bar-
gaining rather than a professional body, and it now in practice oper-
ates as a trade union. From July, 1960, through June, 1971, there 
were 631 "strikes, work stoppages, and interruptions of services," by 
public school teachers. Of these, 439 were called by NEA or its 
affiliates, 156 by AFT locals, and 36 by an independent organization 
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or were jointly sponsored or had no organizational backing.28 The NEA 
1972 convention gave a definite priority to organizing higher educa-
tion. By 1970, it had as many contracts with institutions of higher 
learning as the American Federation of Teachers had. Since that time, 
the assocation has slowly forged ahead, and by June, 1980, NEA or its 
affiliates were agents for 304 institutions of higher education.29 In 
spite of its conversion to unionism, however, it remains relatively 
conservative and can be considered to occupy a middle position in the 
ideological spectrum between the AAUP and the AFT. 
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American Association of University Professors. AAUP, founded in 
1915 by a group of distinguished faculty members at several of the 
nation's leading universities, has for more than half a century been 
the only national professional assocation that represents exclusively, 
without regard to academic discipline or types of institutions with 
which they are identified. It has been concerned primarily with pro-
tecting academic freedom, tenure, and due process; advancing faculty 
salaries by fostering minimum standards; and gaining faculty partici-
pation in university governance. Its direct method of representation 
has been through the examination of individual grievances, using cen-
sure of the offending institutions' administration as its primary 
sanction. Until recently, unlike the NEA and the AFT, it rejected 
such terms as 11 employer, 11 "employee," and "adversary relationship" as 
properly descriptive of the internal organization of a college or uni-
versity, insisting instead that faculty members are "officers" and, 
as such, part of a "shared authority," or "joint custodian," scheme 
of governance.30 
AAUP reacted slowly and cautiously to the appearance of faculty 
collective bargaining in American higher education. It had no incli-
nation to abandon its status and activities as a professional asso-
ciation in favor of an exclusive role as a labor organization. In 
spite of these fears, the AAUP Council voted in May, 1966, 11 as a tem-
porary policy to furnish interim guidance, 11 to authorize AAUP chapters 
to seek recognition as bargaining agents at institutions where "effec-
tive faculty voice and adequate protection and promotion of faculty 
economic intersts" did not exist. Three limitations were established: 
a chapter must first obtain the approval of the AAUP general secre-
tary; no strike or work stoppage was to be called; no agency shop 
(compulsory union membership or dues payment) arrangements were to be 
established.31 
In some ways, AAUP found itself in the same position in higher 
education that NEA had occupied a few years earlier as public school 
teachers began turning to collective bargaining. If it resisted col-
lective bargaining and discouraged its local chapters from offering 
themselves as candidates for bargaining agent, it ran the risk that, 
where other organizations were selected as the faculty bargaining 
agent, some of its chapters might not survive.32 Thus, since 1969, 
the association has officially began to represent institutions of 
higher learning, primarily four-year colleges and universities, but 
including a few community and junior colleges. 
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In October, 1971, the AAUP Council took a major step toward a 
complete and enthusiastic commitment to faculty collective bargaining. 
The council announced that henceforth the association would pursue 
collective bargaining "as a major additional way" of achieving AAUP 1 s 
goals; that it would encourage "interested and well-qualified associa-
tion chapters themselves to seek certification as the exclusive repre-
sentatives of the faculty" in order to avoid the election of other 
bargaining agents that have not demonstrated any sustained sense of 
obligation to press beyond the letter of contract in order to secure 
academic justice; and that such association "resources and staffs" 
would be made available 11 as are necessary for a vigorous selective 
development" of collective bargaining beyond present levels.33 
The 1972 AAUP annual meeting, after a lengthy discussion, ap-
proved the new policy statement on collective bargaining by a very 
large majority.34 The AAUP thus remains in a somewhat indeterminate 
situation, and it may well be seen as insufficiently aggressive by 
many faculty members and paraprofessionals, although in actual bar-
gaining it may be just as effective rivals. As of June, 1980, it was 
the bargaining agent of 54 four-year and 12 two-year institutions.35 
Organizational Characteristics 
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Studies of the causes of faculty bargaining at particular insti-
tutions or systems of higher education indicate that faculty dissatis-
faction with a wide range of working conditions does distinguish among 
faculty who support collective bargaining.36 However, the specific 
issues about which faculty who support collective bargaining are dis-
satisfied vary from institution to institution. This finding from the 
literature, coupled with statistics on the extent and pattern of 
faculty unionization, lends support to a conclusion that it is not 
absolute differences in working conditions among institutions which 
primarily explain variations in the pattern of unionization. These 
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differences between types of institutions have always existed (for 
example, salaries have usually been higher and governance usually more 
extensive at four-year colleges). Rather, it appears that changes in 
higher education which have affected various types of institutions 
differentially play an important part in explaining the pattern of 
faculty unionization. The nature of these changes is discussed below. 
Organizational Change 
As Garbarino points out, the growth of state systems of higher 
education over the past decade has been rapid.37 The growth in size 
of public higher education has been accompanied by structural changes 
which have added layers of authority external to individual institu-
tions in the form of statewide governing boards. External governing 
bodies have operated to reduce faculty influence and this probably 
accounts in part for the rapid organization of statewide systems where 
unionization is not blocked by the absence of legislation (e.g. Cali-
fornia and Wisconsin). The findings of Lozier and Mortimera38 for the 
Pennsylvania State Colleges and Feuille and Blandin for the University 
of Oregon confirm that faculty insecurity about the influence of ex-
ternal authorities is related to support of faculty bargaining. 
Concomitant with the rapid growth in public higher education has 
been the change experienced by single-campus four-year institutions 
which were formerly considered teachers' colleges. The transformation 
of the educational mission of teachers' colleges into institutions 
with a broader curriculum created tension because established struc-
tures and relationships were upset. Faculty hired under the old mis-
sion have been threatened with obsolescence under the new. In the 
terminology of Kahn, their original 11 major bargain 11 with the organi-
zation, which set out their expectations about their relationship with 
the organization, has been altered unilaterally.40 This creates the 
situation in which one is likely to find senior faculty, in this 
instance the education faculty, strongly supportive of the collective 
bargaining movement. 
To accommodate the increased demand for higher education during 
the 1960 1 s, new colleges, especially two-year colleges, were started. 
Many community colleges were formed virtually overnight, and the fac-
ulties were gathered rather suddenly from many quarters. For better 
or worse the organizational structures and the mutual accommodation of 
diverse faculty members have not had the usual mellowing of years.41 
Thus, in community colleges and other relatively new institutions, the 
absence of stabilized collegial decision-making relationships, tradi-
tions; and structures can be a source of faculty dissatisfaction, 
creating pressures for bargaining. 
Internal Government 
Dissatisfaction with the faculty role in governance is the major 
non-economic reason cited for faculty unionization. Under the tradi-
tional concept, the function of administration in the university, from 
the point of view of the faculty was to provide the facilities, and 
the students were there to receive instruction. As universities and 
colleges become more complex places, however, the administration has 
taken on more of the policymaking function and, in addition, has be-
come more remote and professionalized.42 
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An American Association of Higher Education study in 1967 con-
eluded that on a continuum of administrative dominance to faculty 
dominance, 25 percent of the U.S. institutions of higher education 
were characterized by administrative dominance, 50 percent had admin-
istrative primacy, with faculty only in a consultive role, 25 percent 
sharing authority between faculty and administrators, a very few 
institutions had faculty governance in consultation with the adminis-
tration, and no instances of faculty dominance could be found. 43 A 
statement by the American Council on Education reports that 51 percent 
of the faculties surveyed felt that they had little influence in 
decision-making, and another 44 percent felt that faculty participa-
tion in decision-making was less than ideal .44 An article surveyed 
the research of faculty participation in institutional planning and 
summarized: "Planning is not considered a legitimate part of the 
faculty role. 11 45 
While administrators have seemingly been gaining greater power, 
some faculty have been asking for a greater role in planning, budget-
ing, and finance allocation, and the setting of institutional goals 
and priorities.46 
A growth in the power of administrators represents an upset 
in the presumed balance between academic activities and 
support activities on campus. The faculty often grumbles 
that administrators are overpaid, and that too much atten-
tion is given to support activities (often called simply 
red tape) rather than to the goals of the University. 
Faculty members resent too what they feel to be the ill e-
gi timate presentations of some administrators to 1 represent 1 
the faculty or the university. The growth in the power of 
administrators, in itself, regarded as necessarily unde-
sirable, even by the academic person (who typically holds 
highly traditional views of what the university ought to 
be doing), provided that administrators use their power 
to help the university attain goals that academic people 
accept. The situation becomes a source of genuine concern 
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only when administrators are seen both as having more power 
than the faculty and as using that power to pursue goals 
considered undesirable or, at least, tangenial to desirable 
goals.47 
In the recent development of multicampus universities and col-
leges, a good deal of decision-making power has left the individual 
campus altogether; indeed, the Carnegie Commission has argued that 
this redistribution of power has in fact been greater than any trans-
fer on the campuses. At the same time, the student body has pressed 
for a greater share in power, sometimes seeing the educational system 
as a suitable available vehicle through which to express militant 
feelings about the large society. The growing complexity of the sys-
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tern has also produced an increasing number of technicians, librarians, 
teaching assistants, and aids of various kinds whose interests also 
must be considered.48 Faricy depicts the atmosphere as follows: 
Moreover, the various groups within the university--
students, junior faculty, senior faculty, administrators, 
clerical service, and managerial staff--no longer fully 
trust each other. In general, faith in people has been 
replaced by faith in rules, codes, and procedures. 
Respect and cooperation is replaced by distrust and con-
frontation. Shared authority in the collegial sense, 
once the goals of most factions on the campus is gradually 
being replaced by a sharing of authority based on confron-
tations and threats of nongerformance of duties until 
satisfaction is achieved.49 
A system of shared authority between faculty and administrators 
has been the traditional goal of the AAUP and faculty senate, but the 
effectiveness of shared authority depends largely upon the mutual 
respect and trust among the constituencies of the university or col-
lege. There is increasingly evidence that little legitimacy and trust 
exists on college and university campuses.50 Kemerer and Baldridge 
found that persons who had 11 high trust 11 in the administration were 
less likely to have positive attitudes toward FCB than were persons 
with 11 low trust. 11 51 
Other Organizational Factors 
In an analysis of the 1969 American Council on Education--
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education data covering 60,000 faculty 
from a representative selection of higher educational institutions, 
Carr and Van Eyck52 found support for collective negotiations strong-
est at two-year institutions and least strong at the universities. 
These patterns of attitudinal support for collective negotiations are 
paralleled by the experience of union organization. As of June, 1980, 
there are large numbers of unionized two-year colleges (415 public 
two-year colleges) and relatively small numbers of unionzied univer-
sities53 (170 four-year universities). 
Ladd and Lipset argue that in addition to institutional type, 
institutional status is also an important variable. Schools that rank 
high in institutional prestige are less likely to be involved in col-
lective bargaining than are those with less status. That is, profes-
sors at major schools are much less "employees," much more the con-
trol ling force in their institutions, than are their colleagues at 
lesser places. In the upper reaches of academy, faculty generally 
have acquired almost all the power to choose new employees, or col-
leagues, to judge whether they should be retained and given tenure 
and, to a lesser but still substantial degree, to determine individual 
salary increases.54 Institutional affiliation (public versus private) 
is also a major institutional variable related to the adoption of 
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collective negotiations. The majority of unionized campuses are pub-
lic institutions. 
In connection with their work on the effect of FCB on governance, 
Kemerer and Baldridge found that institutions that had been estab-
lished for some time were less likely to support FCB than were 
younger institutions. They also reported that colleges and universi-
ties where a high percentage of the faculty hold the Ph.D. were less 
likely to support bargaining.55 
In an analysis of institutional factors associated with collec-
tive bargaining activity, ChandlerS6 found institutional size to be 
related to rates of unionization. Large institutions and/or institu~ 
tional systems were more likely to have collective bargaining con-
tracts. Institutions which had experienced rapid growth followed by 
a decline were more prone to unionization than were institutions whose 
growth pattern had been different. Rapid institutional growth is 
often accompanied by administrative growth and increased bureaucra-
tization. 
Faculty Characteristics 
Environmental pressures and institutional characteristics are not 
the only factors that influence faculty unionization, of course. The 
decision to join a union is an individual one, and some individuals 
are more inclined to embrace collective bargaining than others. Fol-
lowing are several individual characteristics that affect this deci-
sion. 
In an analysis of data from 60,000 faculty which were collected 
for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Ladd and Lipset found 
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that young, untenured faculty of low rank were the most likely to sup-
port FCs.57 They also found that degree of salary satisfaction was a 
major determinant of support for FCB. Those who were dissatisfied 
with their salary were likely to be supporters of bargaining. 
Class origins might also be expected to affect faculty views to-
ward bargaining. Ladd and Lipset found otherwise. 
Professors at two-year colleges are more heavily children 
of blue-collar workers (29 percent) than faculty at uni-
versities (19 percent), but this has little to do with the 
former 1 s greater receptivity to unionism. This is so be-
cause there is no correlation whatsoever between their 
class backgrounds and the orientations of academic men and 
women to collective bargaining and strikes, or indeed to 
any national or campus political controversies.58 
Religious background has been found to predict faculty attitude 
toward unions. Moore found that nonProtestants were more militant 
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supporters of unions.59 Ladd and Lipset found that Jews were more 
likely than Catholics to support faculty bargaining. In turn, Catho-
lics were more supportive of bargaining than Protestants.60 
Although Moore reported that male faculty had more favorable 
attitudes toward collective negotiations than did female faculty at 
Pennsylvania community colleges,61 Feuille and Blandin found no dif-
ferences between men and women in the general level of support for FCB 
at the University of Oregon.62 
The studies of faculty attitudes toward bargaining confirm 
earlier evidence that academic discipline is related to faculty atti-
tudes and behavior. Generally, the support by discipline in descend-
ing order was the social sciences, the humanities, the natural 
sciences, business, and engineering.63 Feuill and Blandin64 found 
no relationship, and Corwin65 suggested that the militancy of a 
disciplirie may be less closely associated with its level of prestige 
within a particular organization; the inconsistency between a depart-
ment's prestige and its autonomy from the administration may be highly 
correlated with militancy. 
Institutional size, based on F.T.E., was found related to the 
percentage of union members on a campus in a study conducted in the 
California State College system. Those institutions with over nine 
thousand students were found to have a greater percentage of union 
members than those with less. This same study indicated that rate 
of institutional growth did not seem related to the prevalence of 
faculty unionization.66 
A familiarity with unions prior to joining college and university 
staffs has also been found to be positively related to support of bar-
gaining.67 Past experience with union activities would be likely to 
reduce barriers to unionism unless the experiences were unsatisfac-
tory. In two-year institutions in both Michigan and New York, many 
faculty had previous experience with unions as public school teach-
ers.68 In his study of two-year colleges, Moore found that faculty 
with previous teaching experience in high schools were more supportive 
of bargaining.69 Additionally, the location of an institution in a 
more highly unionized environment or the socialization of a number of 
the faculty of an institution in such an environment would be expected 
to ease the transition to unionism by faculty. A Youngstown State 
University administrator felt that the location of the institution 
in a labor-oriented community was one of the factors facilitating 
the unionization of that institution.70 Carr and Van Eyck felt that 
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CUNY's proximity to the militant public school experiences in New York 
was pertinent.71 
Faculty with liberal political learnings were also likely to show 
more favorable attitudes in respect to collective bargaining.72 But, 
Ladd and Lipset also found that the most liberal faculty were the most 
critical of governance matters and were from elite institutions. They 
concluded: 
Professors at upper-tier schools, and highly achieving 
academics in general, are significantly cross-pressured 
with regard to faculty unionism. Their liberalism would 
incline them to support it; but their objective interests 
and the general structure of their academic values bring 
them into opposition. And, as we have seen, the latter 
considerations typically prove decisive.73 
Carr and Van Eyck discuss the relationship between dissatisfac-
tion and support for faculty collective negotiations. Using the same 
Carnegie data base as Ladd and Lipset, they concluded that dissatis-
faction with governance is often associated with support for collec-
tive negotiations. Faculty who perceive the administration of their 
department as autocratic rather than democratic are more likely to 
support faculty unions than are those who feel the administration is 
democratic. 74 
Dissatisfaction with governance was also found to be related to 
support for FCB by Alluto and Belasco. Collecting data from teachers 
employed in two school districts located in western New York state, 
they found that the degree of participation in governance was a useful 
predictor of teacher attitudes toward collective bargaining.75 A 1972 
study by Begin and Browne in six New Jersey community colleges deter-
mined that a more tightly structured bureaucracy had been the main 
cause of faculty pressure for collective negotiations.76 
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Summary 
Chapter II has reviewed the literature concerning factors contri-
buted to the movement of faculty in establishing collective negotia-
tions. It was discussed that collective bargaining entered higher 
education through the community colleges, where teachers and adminis-
trators often exist in much the same relationship as that found in 
elementary and secondary schools. With the advent of state legis-
lation enabling public employees to bargain collectively and with the 
1970 decision by the National Labor Relation Board to take jurisdic-
tion over most private colleges and universities, the range of union-
ized faculties has broadened considerably. 
More specifically, among the most significant factors mentioned 
were: 
1. The passage of permissive collective negotiations legisla-
ti on; 
2. A depressed academic job market during the 1970's; 
3. The centralization of decision-making that accompanied the 
growth of large state-wide systems of public colleges and universi-
ties; 
4. Increasing intrusions by elected officials into institutional 
affairs with a concomitant loss of local autonomy; 
5. A lack of faculty involvement in the governance of the newer 
state liberal arts colleges and community junior colleges; 
6. The financial problems currently plaguing many institutions; 
and 
7. The organizational rivalry of the AAUP, NEA, and AFT. 
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Thus, in conclusion, 
.•• if student activism and reactions to efforts to 
politicize academy explicitly proved to be the major 
developments affecting American campuses in the latter 
half of the 1960's, faculty trade union organization 
and formal collective bargaining are likely to insti-
tute the most important issues in the 1970's.77 
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CHAPTER I I I 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to state the problem, the selec-
tion of subjects, the description of the instruments, the method for 
collecting data, and the statistical procedures used. 
Statement of the Problem 
The study was designed to determine: (1) what attitudes com-
munity junior college faculty members hold toward collective nego-
tiations; (2) whether faculty members• attitudes toward collective 
negotiations are related to their perceptions of participation in 
academic decision-making; (3) whether state supported and private 
community junior colleges• faculty members differ in attitudes toward 
collective negotiations; (4) whether selected individual colleges 
differ in attitudes toward collective negotiations; and (5) whether 
significant relationships exist between the selected demographic and 
career characteristics and faculty members• attitudes toward collec-
tive negotiations. 
Selection of the Subjects 
Subjects involved in the study were: (1) full-time faculty mem-
bers from state supported community colleges in Arkansas, Missouri, 
North Dakota, and Oklahoma and (2) full-time faculty members from 
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private community colleges in Oklahoma. The particular study popula-
tion was selected because of the increasing likelihood of collective 
negotiations occurring in states which do not presently have statutory 
law to permit collective negotiations. 
Criteria used for the selection of public community junior col-
leges were: 
1. Accreditation by North Central Association of Colleges and 
Secondary Schools; 
2. Institutional member of the American Association of Community 
and Junior Colleges; 
3. Operate on semester system; and 
4. Number of full-time equivalent faculty (all full-time+ one-
thi rd part-time faculty) between 40 and 55. 
Criteria used for the selection of private community junior col-
leges were: 
1. Accreditation by North Central Association of Colleges and 
Secondary School. 
2. Operate on semester system. 
Instrumentation 
Research Questionnaire 
Research questionnaire used was comprised of two parts: Part I--
Collective Negotiations Scale and Part II--Decisional Participation 
Scale. 
Parts I and II were used by the investigator to measure the 
variables being investigated in this study. Part I, the Collective 
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Negotiations Scale, served as a measure of the dependent variable. 
Part II, the Decisional Participaton Scale, served as a measure of 
independent variable. 
Collective Negotiations Scale 
The instrument used to assess attitudes toward collective nego-
tiations in the present study was the Collective Negotiations (CN) 
Scale, originally developed by Carlton! and modified and refined by 
Moore in his dissertation study.2 Carlton's scale was a thirty-item, 
Likert-type scale designed to assess attitudes of teachers toward 
collective action by teachers. The scale was based on the following 
assumptions: 
1. that attitudes are quantitatively identifiable, and there-
fore, can be assigned score values; 
2. that attitudes lie along a continuum running from strong 
disfavor to equally strong favor; 
3. that collective negotiations is made up of at least two com-
plementary facets; the negotiation process and sufficient coerceive 
force to assume near equality of the parties involved; and 
4. that the above three assumptions are believed to be non-
separable characteristics.3 
Carlton used a jury of 100 educators to rate critically an ini-
tial pool of 104 items, and then applied an item analysis to the 
results to select the thirty items with the most discriminatory power. 
Split-half reliability of the scale was computed to be .84.4 
Moore modified Carlton's scale primarily through word substitu-
tion. Such words as "faculty" and "college" were used to replace the 
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words "teacher" and "school. 11 the substitutions, which did not seri-
ously affect the validity of the individual items, were made to make 
the scale suitable for community college faculty.5 
As part of a pilot project, Moore administered the CN scale to 
seventy-nine community college faculty members, and used appropriate 
computer programs to perform an item analysis, compute the reliability 
and standard error of measurement, and to calculate measures of cen-
tral tendency. The reliability coefficient was reported to be .92 and 
the standard error of measurement was equal to 4.39.6 
In addition to the item analysis, Moore factor analyzed the pilot 
study reponses and found one dominant factor which accounted for 70.67 
percent of the extracted variance and a second factor which accounted 
for 16.42 percent of the extracted variance. As a result of the item 
and factor analysis, five items were deleted from the CN scale. Five 
new items were added when the ratings of a panel of judges were found 
to be compatible.? 
The CN scale used in Moore's primary study was a thirty item, 
Likert-type scale. The scoring of each item ranged from one through 
six with the high score arbitrarily assigned to those responses favor-
able to collective negotiations. The six response choices for each 
i tern ranged from "Agree Very Strongly" or "Disagree Very Strongly." 
No neutral reponse was used. There were 15 positively phrased and 15 
negatively phrased questions with the direction of items varied to 
reduce the effect of a response set.8 
Moore performed an item analysis on the primary study responses 
and found that each item had an adjusted item--total score correlation 
of .40 or higher. The t values for the differences between item means 
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for the low (27 percent) and high (27 percent) groups were statisti-
cally significant at the .05 level .9 
A factor analysis was computed to study further the unidimension-
ality of the scale. The primary factor accounted for 66.51 reported 
as • 96 while the standard error of measurement was reported as 4. solO 
Moore organized the CN scale items into the following three cate-
gories to aid the analysis and interpretation: (1) items pertaining 
to attitudes toward collective action, (2) items pertaining to atti-
tudes toward the implementation of sanctions, and (3) items pertaining 
to attitudes toward the withholding of faculty services.11 
These categories were thought to be a continuum representing 
increasing levels of intensity of militant attitudes. The 
first category (collective action) represented less intense 
attitudes than the second category (sanctions). The third 
category (withholding services) was thought to represent the 
most extreme form of militancy.12 
A copy of Moore's CN scale used in the present study is contained 
in Appendix A. 
Decisional Participation Scale 
The Decisional Participation (DP) scale was developed by John 
H. Schuh, in cooperation with three present deans of liberal arts 
colleges within the sample population in order to investigate the 
decision-making process in Liberal Arts Colleges of large universi-
ties. The three cooperation deans offered suggestions and modifica-
tions during their thorough examination of it. Ultimately they were 
satisfied as to the validity of the scale. The questionnaire includes 
21 academic issues.13 
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Decisional participation was defined in this study as the discre-
pancy between a faculty member's current and preferred rates of parti-
cipation in academic decision-making. The DP scale was administered 
in two parts. In the first part faculty members were asked to indi-
cate "Do they currently participate in each of the twenty-one academic 
issues.?" and in the second part they were asked to indicate "Do they 
desire to participate in each of the twenty-one academic issues?" An 
index was derived by summing the number of decisions in which each 
faculty member currently participates and those in which he wishes to 
particiapte, and computing the difference between these two figures. 
Those differences became the index of decisional discrepancy. Faculty 
were then placed in groups characterized by: (1) decisional depriva-
tion (current participation less than desired participation); (2) 
decisional equilibrium (current participation equal to desired par-
ticipation); and (3) decisional saturation (current participation 
greater than desired participation. 
A copy of Schuh's Decisional Participation Scale used in the 
present study is contained in Appendix B. 
Demographic and Career Information 
The secondary purpose of this study was to investigate the rela-
tionships between selected demographic and career characteristics of 
community junior college faculty and their attitudes toward collective 
negotiations. This section, which contains eleven items, is composed 
of variables found by Moore to be significantly related (statisti-
cally) to attitudes toward collective negotiations. Item One in the 
demographic and career section, which asked the respondent if he/she 
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is "part-time or full-time," is· included as a validation of full-time 
teaching status. Questionnaires from other than full-time teaching 
faculty were disregarded. 
A copy of demographic and career information questionnaire used 
in the present study is contained in Appendix C. 
Method of Data Collection 
In order to procure approval of the community college presidents 
to involve their faculty in the study, on November 15, 1980, 31 
research questionnaires and explanatory cover letters14 were sent to 
10 private and 21 state supported community junior college presidents 
in Arkansas, Missouri, North Dakota, and Oklahoma. Shortly there-
after, five community junior college presidents agreed to provide 
their faculty with the oppotunity to participate in the study. After 
numerous lettersl5 and telephone calls in December, 1980, and January, 
1981, the presidents of four of the remaining of the twenty-six insti-
tutions pledged their support. 
On February 1, 1981, 285 questionnaires, explanatory cover let-
ters, and self stamped, self addressed evelopes were mailed to 54 
faculty members in two private community junior colleges in Oklahoma 
and to 231 faculty members in seven public supported community junior 
colleges in Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma and North Dakota. A copy of 
the letter to the faculty members for the investigator appears in 
Appendix F. 
Approximately 20 days after the initial mailing, follow-up 
letters were sent to faculty who had not responded. A copy of this 
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letter is included in Appendix G. On March 10, 1981, the data col-
lection phase of the study was tenninated. 
Of the original 285 questionnaires that were mailed, 185 were 
returned, approximately 65 percent. Of the returned group, 159 ques-
tionnaires, 56 percent of the sample population, were usable for the 
purpose of analysis. There were 26 questionnaires that were not 
usable for various reasons. If the respondents either failed to com-
plete entire sections of the questionnaire, or omitted some items of 
any particular section, the questionnaires were disregarded. 
The number of questionnaires returned by the faculties of the 
nine participating institutions appears in Table I. The institutional 
response rate ranges from a low of 53.12 percent to a high of 75 per-
cent. 
Data Analysis 
The responses from faculty members were coded, tabulated on data 
sheets, and key punched at the Oklahoma State University Computer 
Center. As a means of testing the statistical significance of each 
correlation coefficient, null hypotheses were tested at the .05 and 
.01 levels using Z test procedures.16 Since the study was fundamen-
tally exploratory and because of the speculative nature of the 
research hypotheses, it was decided to conduct two-tailed Z tests. 
The statistical procedures used in the study were as follows: 
Reseach Question One 
What is the general attitude orientation of community junior 
college faculty members toward collective negotiations? The three 
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agreement response choices were collapsed into one category of "agree-
ment," and the three disagreement response choices were collapsed into 
one category of "disagreement." 
TABLE I 
NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES MAILED TO FACULTY AND THE 
PERCENTAGE RETURNED BY COMMUNITY JUNIOR COLLEGES 
Community Number Number Percentage 
College Mailed Received Received 
1 45 29 64.44 
2 35 23 65. 71 
3 32 17 53.12 
4 29 21 72. 41 
5 34 25 73. 53 
6 30 20 66.66 
7 36 23 63.88 
8 36 21 58.33 
9 8 6 75.00 
Total 285 185 64. 91 
Null Hypothesis One 
There are no statistically significant differences toward callee-
tive negotiations for individuals classified as decisionally deprived, 
saturated, or at equilibrium. A one-way analysis of variance was used 
to compare attitudes toward collective negotiations of three deci-
sional participation groups. 
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Null Hypothesis Two 
There are no statistically significant differences in attitudes 
toward collective negotiations between state supported and private 
community junior colleges. At-test showing the significant differ-
ence in the means of state supported and private community junior 
colleges was used. 
Null Hypothesis Three 
There are no statistically significant differences in attitudes 
toward collective negotiations among the selected individual colleges. 
A one-way analysis of variance was used to compare attitudes toward 
collective negotiations of selected individual colleges. 
Null Hypothesis Four 
There are no statistically significant relationships between the 
selected demographic and career characteristics of age, sex, religion, 
political preference, satisfaction with community junior college 
teaching, tenure status, degree, rank, teaching curriculum, academic 
field, and faculty members• attitudes toward collective negotiations. 
A zero-order correlation coefficient was used as a measure of comput-
ing the relationship between these variables and attitudes toward 
collective negotiations. 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to present a description of 
the manner in which the problem and hypotheses were investigated. The 
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problem was identified as the relationship between faculty attitudes 
toward collective negotiations and their perceptions of participation 
in academic decision making. 
Three instruments were utilized to collect data on the variable, 
the Collective Negotiations Scale, the Decisional Participation Scale, 
and Demographic and Career Information. The instruments were distri-
buted to a selected sample of 285 full-time community junior college 
faculty members in four states of Arkansas, Missouri, North Dakota, 
and Oklahoma. Sixty-five percent of the sample returned. 
A simple analysis of response patterns to the collective negotia-
tions scale was completed to assess faculty attitudes toward collec-
tive negotiations. A one-way analysis of variance was used to test 
the first and the third hypotheses and a t-test for the second 
hypothesis. A zero-order correlation coefficient was computed to 
determine the relationship between the selected demographic and career 
characteristics of the respondent faculty and their attitudes toward 
collective negotiations, based on collective negotiations scale 
scores. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Introduction 
The presentation and analysis of data for this research are 
reported as they relate to each of the research questions under study. 
The .05 level of significance was used to accept or reject the hypoth-
eses. The presentation and analysis of data appear in the following 
sequence: 
1. Findings related to faculty responses to the Collective 
Negotiations Scale 
2. Findings related to the Null Hypotheses 
a. Null Hypothesis One: There are no statistically significant 
differences toward collective negotiations for invididuals classified 
as decisionally deprived, saturated, or at equilibrium. 
b. Null Hypothesis Two: There are no statistically significant 
differences in attitudes toward collective negotiations between state 
supported and private community junior colleges. 
c. Null Hypothesis Three: There are no statistically signifi-
cant differences in attitudes toward collective negotiations among the 
selected individual colleges. 
d. Null Hypothesis Four: There are no statistically signifi-
cant relationships between the selected demographic and career 
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characteristics of age, sex, religion, political preference, satisfac-
tion with junior college teaching, tenure status, degree, rank, teach-
ing curriculum, academic field, and faculty members• attitudes toward 
collective negotiations. 
Findings Related to Faculty Responses 
to the Collective Negotiations Scale 
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One of the purposes of this study was to assess the general atti-
tude orientation of community junior college faculty toward collective 
negotiations. In order to determine the receptiveness of community 
junior college faculty to the use of collective negotiations in higher 
education, an analysis of the respondents to selected items on the 
collective negotiations scale was undertaken. 
The items were ogranized into three categories for the purpose of 
analysis and interpretation: (1) items pertaining to attitudes toward 
collective action, (2) items pertaining to attitudes toward the imple-
mentation of sanctions, (3) items pertaining to attitudes toward the 
withholding of faculty services. These categories were thought to be 
a continuum representing increasing levels of intensity of militant 
attitudes. The first category (collective action) represented less 
intense attitudes than the second category (sanctions). The third 
category (withholding services) was thought to represent the most 
extreme form of militancy. For purposes of clearer discussions of the 
faculty response patterns to the Collective Negotiations Scale, the 
three agreement responses of the instrument have been collapsed into 
one category of 11 agreement, 11 and the three disagreement responses of 
the instrument into one category of 11 disagreement. 11 
Attitudes Toward Collective Action 
The percentage of responses to each response choice in the fif-
teen items in the collective action category are contained in Table 
II •. Reference to the number of faculty was purposely omitted to 
assume anonymity. An analysis of the subjects• responses to these 
items seems to indicate that community junior college faculty are 
favorably disposed to collective negotiations. For example, approxi-
mately 89 percent agreed that faculty should be able to organize and 
bargain collectively (item 5), and 92 percent agreed that faculty mem-
bers should be able to organize freely and to bargain collectively 
about their working conditions of employement (item 1). Sixty-six 
percent of the subjects agreed that collective negotiations is a good 
way to unite the teaching profession into a powerful political body 
(item 15), and approximately 82 percent felt that collective negotia-
tions can bring greater order to education (item 30). 
Approximately 81 percent of the subjects agreed that collective 
negotiations is an effective way to limit the unilateral authority of 
the governing board (item 2), while only approximately 18 percent 
agreed that collective negotiations is an infringement on the author-
ity of the board (item 15). 
Furthermore, only 21 percent agreed that it was unwise to estab-
1 ish educational policies and practices through collective negotia-
tions (item 28), and 27 percent felt that collective negotiations is 
primarily a coerceive technique that will have detrimental effects 
on higher education (item 7). Only about 21 percent thought that 
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1. 
2. 
5. 
7. 
TABLE II 
PERCENTAGES OF RESPONSE CHOICE FOR ITEMS OF THE 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS SCALE CATEGORIZED 
AS MEASURES OF ATTITUDES TOWARD 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Item Percentages 
Number AVS AS A D 
I think collective negotiations is an 23.17 36. 53 31.5 4.4 
effective way for faculty to parti-
cipate in determining the conditions 
of their employment. 
I think collective negotiations is an 16.02 29.5 35.9 10. 9 
effective way for faculty to limit 
the unilateral authority of the 
governing board. 
Faculty members should be able to 25.64 32.05 30. 77 5.13 
organize freely and to bargain 
collectively about their working 
conditions. 
I feel that collective negotiations 2.56 3.84 21.15 39.11 
is primarily a coerceive technique 
that will have detrimental effects 
on higher education. 
--ns -------ovs 
1. 9 1. 96 
3.8 3.9 
1.28 5.13 
20.51 12.83 
O'\ ,_. 
TABLE II {Continued) 
Item 
Number AVS 
9. I believe that militant faculty 3.8 
organizations are largely made of 
malcontents and misfits. 
11. I feel that the good faculty 1.28 
members can always get the salary 
they need without resorting to 
collective negotiations. 
12. I believe that collective bargaining, 1. 92 
alias collective negotiations, is 
beneath the dignity of college fac-
ulty members. 
15. I feel that collective negotiations .64 
is an infringement on the authority 
of the governing board and should be 
resisted. 
Percentages 
AS A D 
10.89 26.92 33.97 
4.48 19.23 37.82 
3.2 16.67 37. 82 
5.12 12. 82 44.87 
DS 
13.46 
21.15 
17.94 
21.15 
DVS 
10. 96 
16.04 
22.45 
15.4 
0) 
N 
TABLE II (Continued) 
Item 
Number AVS 
16. I think collective negotiations is 8.33 
a good way to unite the teaching 
profession into a powerful poli-
tical body. 
17. I think that collective negotia- 1. 92 
ted written labor agreements place 
undesirable restrictions on the 
administration. 
18. I think collective negotiations 8.97 
can provide a vehicle whereby 
faculty members gain greater on-
the-job dignity and independence 
in performing their functions. 
19. I believe that many leaders in the 3.20 
drive for collective negotiations 
are power seekers who do not have 
the best interest of education at 
heart. 
Percentages 
AS A D 
14.10 42.94 24.35 
2.56 16.66 54.49 
21. 79 51.28 13.46 
5.12 28.85 42.95 
OS 
5.12 
17.95 
4.48 
14.10 
ovs 
5.16 
6.42 
.02 
5.78 
0\ 
w 
TABLE II {Continued) 
Item Percentages 
Number AVS AS A D OS 
20. The local faculty organization 10.25 21.15 44.23 18.59 6.4 
should seek to regulate standards 
for hiring of new faculty members. 
28. I feel that it is unwise to estab- 1. 92 4.48 17.94 44.87 16.66 
lish educational policies and 
practices through collective 
negotiations. 
30. I think collective negotiations 11.53 21. 79 48.07 11. 53 5.12 
can bring greater order and system 
to education. 
AVS--Agree Very Strongly; AS--Agree Strongly; A--Agree; D--Disagree; DS--Disagree Strongly; 
DVS--Oisagree Very Strongly. 
DVS 
o.oo 
14.1~ 
1.96 
m 
~ 
collective negotiated agreements placed undesirable restrictions on 
the administration (item 17). 
Eighty-two percent agreed that collective negotiations can pro-
vide a vehicle whereby faculty members can gain greater on-the-job 
dignity and independence in performing their functions (item 18). 
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Only 22 percent agreed that collective negotiations is beneath the 
dignity of college faculty members (item 12). A small number, 25 per-
cent agreed that good faculty members can always get the salary they 
need without resorting to collective negotiations (item 11). 
Attitudes Toward Sanctions 
Faculty responses to items pertaining to the implementation of 
sanctions appear in Table III. Faculty responses to items in this 
category seem to indicate that community junior college faculty have 
favorable attitudes toward use of various forms of sanctions. Approx-
imately 75 percent agreed that faculty have a right to impose sanc-
tions on governing boards under certain circumstances (item 21). 
Eighty percent agreed that when a governing board denies the requests 
of the faculty, faculty have a right to present those facts to the 
public and their professional associates (item 29). Approximately 
60 percent agreed that faculty organizations at local, state, and 
national levels should publicize unfair practices by a governing 
board through various mass media (item 6). 
Sixty-seven percent agreed that sanctions are a means of improv-
ing educational opportunities and eliminating conditions detrimental 
to professional service (item 23). Approximately 70 precent agreed 
6. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
TABLE III 
PERCENTAGES OF RESPONSE CHOICE FOR ITEMS OF THE 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS SCALE CATEGORIZED 
AS MEASURES OF ATTITUDES TOWARD 
COLLECTIVE SANCTIONS 
Item Percentages 
Number AVS AS A D 
Faculty organizations at local, state, 9.6 18.58 31.41 32.05 
and national levels should publicize 
unfair practices by a governing board 
through the media such as TV, radio, 
newspapers, and magazines. 
I think faculty members have the right 10.25 11.53 52.56 22.43 
to impose sanctions on governing boards 
under certain circumstances. 
I think that sanctions are a step 8.33 13.46 48.36 24.36 
forward in acceptance of faculty 
responsibility for self-discipline 
and for insistence upon conditions 
conducive to an effective program 
of education. 
I believe sanctions are a means of 5.7 10.25 50.64 25.64 
improving educational opportunities 
and eliminating conditions detrimen-
tal to professional services. 
OS DVS 
5.76 2.6 
3.20 .03 
5.12 .66 
5.76 2.01 
(j) 
(j) 
TABLE III (Continued) 
Item 
Number 
24. I believe that censure by means of 
articles in professional association 
journals, special study reports, news-
papers, or other mass media, is a 
legitimate technique for faculty use. 
27. I believe that any faculty sanction 
or other coerceive measure is completely 
unprofessional. 
29. I believe that when the governing board 
denies the requests of the faculty, the 
faculty has a right to present the facts 
to the public and to their professional 
associates employed in other colleges. 
AVS 
6.41 
2.56 
14.74 
Percentages 
AS A ---0 DS 
15.38 46.79 25.64 3.2 
3.84 25.0 42.94 14. 74 
18.59 46.15 16.02 3.20 
Avs-...:--Ag-ree VtfrY-Strongly; AS--Agree Strongly; A--Agree; D--Di sagree; DS--Di sagree Strongly; 
DVS--Disagree Very Strongly. 
DVS 
2.58 
10. 92 
1.3 
()) 
........ 
that sanctions are a step forward in the acceptance of faculty respon-
sibility for self-discipline and for the insistence upon conditions 
conductive to effective educational programs (item 22). 
Approximately 69 percent agreed that certain forms of censure 
were legitimate techniques for use by faculty (item 24). Only 31 
percent believed that faculty sanctions or other coerceive measures 
were completely unprofessional (item 27). 
It appears that community junior college faculty view implementa-
tion of selected forms of sanctions as a legitimate course of collec-
tive action. As a result of this acceptance, the use of sanctions 
could become an important tool in conflict situations. 
Attitudes Toward Withholding Services 
An analysis of the items pertaining to the withholding of faculty 
services, the most severe form of militant action, seems to indicate 
that community junior college faculty are more divided in their atti-
tudes toward this form of group behavior than they are toward other 
forms of collective action. The percentages of responses to each item 
in this category appear in Table IV. 
Eighty-seven percent agreed that collective negotiations should 
omit the threat of withholding services (item 4). Approximately 61 
percent agreed that faculty members should not strike in order to 
enforce their demands (item 10). 
Fifty-three percent agreed that faculty members should be able to 
withhold services when a satisfactory agreement between their organi-
zation and the governing board cannot be reached (item 3). Approxi-
mately 51 percent agreed that faculty services were not so necessary 
3. 
4. 
8. 
10. 
TABLE IV 
PERCENTAGES OF RESPONSE CHOICE FOR ITEMS OF THE 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS SCALE CATEGORIZED 
AS MEASURES OF ATTITUDES TOWARD 
WITHHOLDING SERVICES 
Item Percentages 
Number AVS AS A D 
Faculty members should have the right 6.4 14.75 31.41 36.53 
to withhold their services when 
satisfactory agreement between their 
organization and the governing board 
cannot be reached. 
Collective negotiations should if 12.82 30. 77 44.23 5.13 
possible omit the threat of with-
holding services. 
I feet that strikes on the part of 13.46 19.23 44.23 15.38 
faculty members are an undesirable 
aspect of collective negotiations. 
Faculty members should not strike 5.12 16.02 39.74 25.64 
in order to enforce their demands. 
OS 
5.12 
3.8 
3.8 
10.26 
DVS 
5.79 
3.25 
3.9 
3.24 
en 
l.O 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Item Percentages 
Number AVS AS A D DS ovs 
13. I believe that strikes, sanctions, 2.56 10.25 34.61 30. 77 11. 53 10.28 
boycotts, mandated arbitration or 
mediation are improper procedures 
to be used by public community or 
junior college faculty who are 
dissatisfied with their conditions 
of employment. 
14. I feel that a faculty member cannot 5.76 7.69 43.59 25.00 8.97 8.99 
withhold his services without viola-
ting professional ethics and trust. 
25. I feel that the traditional position 4.48 7.69 39.10 30.12 8.97 9.64 
that faculty members, as public 
employees, may not strike is in the 
best interest of public higher 
educational. 
26. I don't feel that the services of the 6.41 8.33 36.53 41.02 5.76 2.95 
faculty are so necessary to the public 
welfare as to necessitate the forfeit-
ure of the right of faculty to strike. 
AVS--Agree Very Strongly; AS--Agree Strongly; A--Agree; 0--Disagree; DS--Oisagree Strongly; 
DVS--Disagree Very Strongly. 
"'-J 
0 
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to the public welfare as ta necessitate the forfeiture of the right of 
faculty to strike (item 26). Forty-four percent agreed that the tra-
ditional position that faculty members, as public employees, may not 
strike is in the best interest of public higher education. 
Forty-seven percent agreed that strikes, sanctions, boycotts, 
mandated arbitration, or mediation, are improper procedures to be used 
by public junior college faculty members (item 13). Fifty-seven per-
cent felt that a faculty member cannot withhold his services without 
violating professional ethics and trust (item 14). Seventy-seven per-
cent felt that strikes on the part of faculty members are an undesir-
able aspect of collective negotiations (item 8). 
The analysis of these data seemed to indicate that the majority 
of community junior college faculty have favorable attitudes toward 
the use of collective negotiations in public higher education. There 
was considerable consensus among faculty that collective action by 
faculty is desirable. However, there is less consensus concerning the 
appropriateness of various forms of sanctions and the withholding of 
faculty services. In other words, the exercise of group pressure is 
seen as legitimate, but there is hesitance in taking agressive action 
against the administration or governing board such as striking. How-
ever, the climate in community junior colleges seems conducive for 
unionization or certainly a strengthening of the power of faculty 
groups, and for using collective action for agreed upon purposes. 
Findings Related to Hypotheses 
Null Hypothesis One 
There are no statistically significant differences toward collec-
tive negotiations for individuals classified as decisionally deprived, 
saturated, or at equilibrium. 
A one-way analysis of variance test of significance was computed 
on the mean CN Scale scores for each group of decisional participa-
tion. The results of the analysis of variance are contained in Table 
v. 
The analysis of variance test was significant at the .01 level 
(4.75 needed). The null hypothesis was rejected and an alternative 
hypothesis, stating that significant differences in attitudes toward 
collective negotiations existed for individuals classified as deci-
sionally deprived, at equilibrium, or saturated was accepted. Faculty 
who are decisionally saturated tend to have less favorable attitudes 
toward collective negotiations, while faculty who are decisionally 
deprived tend to have highly favorable attitudes. 
Null Hypothesis Two 
There are no statistically significant differences in attitudes 
toward collective negotiations between state supported and private 
community junior colleges. 
At-test was used to compare attitudes toward collective negotia-
tions between state supported and private community junior colleges. 
The results of the t-test are contained in Table VI. 
72 
TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF DECISIONAL PARTICIPATION AND 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AMONG SELECTED 
COMMUNITY JUNIOR COLLEGE FACULTY 
Decisional Participation and 
Mean Scores for Community 
Junior College Facultl Analysis of Variance Table 
State of 
Decisional Sum of Mean 
Participation N Means* S.D. Source OF Squares Squares 
Deprived 105 124.790 19.633 Between Groups 2 19338. 943 9669.468 
Equilibrium 36 104.750 14.140 Within Groups 156 56830.425 364.297 
Saturated 18 96.500 23. 939 Totals 158 76169.312 
*The-nigher mean-scores indicate greater attitudes toward collective negotiations (maximum 
score = 180). 
**Statistically significant at the .01 level of confidence. 
Observed 
F Score 
26.543** 
........ 
w 
TABLE VI 
COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 
BETWEEN STATE SUPPORTED AND PRIVATE 
COMMUNITY JUNIOR COLLEGES 
Standard Standard 
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Cl assifi cation N Mean* Deviation Error t-score 
State Supported Community 124 117. 951 22.507 2.021 1.29** 
Junior Colleges 
Private Community Junior 35 113. 857 19.854 3.356 
Colleges 
*The higher mean scores indicate greater attitudes toward collective 
negotiations (maximum score= 180). 
**No statistically significant difference at the .05 level of confi-
dence. 
The statistical results for hypothesis two indicated a t-score 
of 1.25 which was below the .05 level of significance which equalled 
1.98. The analysis showed no statistically significant differences 
in attitudes toward collective negotiations between state supported 
and private community junior colleges. 
Null Hypothesis Three 
There are no statistically significant differences in attitudes 
toward collective negotiations among the selected individual colleges. 
A one-way analysis of variance test of significance was computed 
on the nine CN Scale means. Table VII presents a summary of the find-
ings. 
Based on statistical analysis, the results for hypothesis three 
indicated an observed F score of 7.086 which was above the .01 level 
of significance, which equalled 2.62. The results showed statis-
tically significant differences existed in attitudes toward collective 
negotiations among the selected individual colleges. The null hypoth-
esis was rejected and an alternative hypothesis, stating that signifi-
cant differences in attitudes toward collective negotiations among the 
selected individual colleges existed was accepted. 
Null Hypothesis Four 
There are no statistically significant relationships between the 
selected demographic and career characteristics of age, sex, religion, 
political preference, satisfaction with junior college teaching, 
tenure status, degree, rank, teaching curriculum, academic field, and 
faculty members' attitudes toward collective negotiations. 
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Community 
Co 11 ege N 
1. 29 
2. 17 
3. 6 
4. 16 
5. 19 
6. 19 
7. 19 
8. 13 
9. 21 
Total 159 
TABLE VII 
COMPARISON OF ATTITUOES TOWARD COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 
AMONG NINE INDIVIDUAL COLLEGES 
Analysis of Variance Table 
Standard Sum of Mean 
Means* Deviation Source OF Squares Squares 
115. 724 20.880 Between 8 20890.349 2611. 293 
117. 882 7. 639 
104. 833 10.998 Within 150 55279.166 368.527 
110.375 18.095 
121. 789 19.446 Total 158 76169.500 
113. 052 26.590 
140.105 22.357 
92. 076 9.604 
120. 714 18.684 
117. 050 21. 956 
*The higher mean scores--rnaTC:-aYe ~freafi~-r -attitudes t_o_w_a-rd-EolTeclTve- negoffa-ffo-ns-T1li-a-ximum 
score::: 180}. 
**A significant statistical difference at the .01 level of confidence. 
Observed 
F Score. 
7.086** 
'-' 
O'I 
Zero-order correlation coefficients were computed as a measure of 
the relationship between these variables and the dependent variable 
(CN). These variables and their associated coefficients of correla-
tion are contained in Table VIII. Null hypotheses were statistically 
tested at the .05 and .01 levels of significance. 
The null hypotheses were accepted at the .05 level of signifi-
cance (r = .159 required) for three of the variables in Table VIII. 
One variable, teaching satisfaction, was statistically significant at 
the .01 level (r = .208 required). Age, sex, religion, tenure status, 
professional rank, and academic field were unrelated to faculty atti-
tudes toward collective negotiations. 
On the political preference variable, faculty were classified on 
a continuum as either: (1) conservative, (2) independent, or (3) 
liberal. The correlation between political preference and CN scale 
scores was statistically significant at the .05 level (r = .1745). 
The interpreation was that faculty who tended to be liberal in poli-
tical preference possessed more favorable attitudes toward collective 
negotiations than did faculty who tended to be conservative. 
The nature of this classification made it advisable to conduct 
a one-way analysis of variance test of significance between group 
mean scores on the CN Scale. The analysis of variance resulted in a 
F ratio of 5.871 that was significant at the .01 level (4.75 is 
required). Table IX presents a summary of findings. The analysis of 
the findings indicated that faculty in the conservative group had 
significantly less favorable attitudes than did faculty in the inde-
pendent and liberal groups. 
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TABLE VIII 
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AND SCORES ON THE 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS SCALE 
Correlation With 
Variables CN Seale Scores 
Age -0.1012 
Sex -0.1373 
Religion 0.1113 
Teaching Satisfaction -0. 2273** 
Political Preference -0.1745* 
Tenure Status -0.1185 
Rank -0. 0917 
Teaching Curriculum 0.1598* 
Degree 0.2004* 
Academic Field 0.1316 
N = 15 
*Correlation coefficient significant at the .05 level. 
**Correlation coefficient significant at the .01 level. 
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Political 
Preference N 
Conservative 44 
Independent 39 
Liberal 76 
TABLE IX 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE FOR FACULTY POLITICAL 
PREFERENCE GROUPS AND SCORES ON THE 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS SCALE 
Analxsis of Variance Table 
Standard Sum of Mean 
Means* Deviation Source DF Squares Squares 
106.086 22.404 Between 2 5532.424 2766.212 
120.333 22.492 Within 156 69258.172 471.144 
120.500 20.098 Total 158 74790.563 
*The higher mean scores indicate greater attitudes toward collective negotiations (maximum 
score "' 180). 
**A significant statistical difference at the .01 level of confidence. 
Observed 
F Score 
5.871** 
....... 
"° 
Satisfaction with community college teaching was significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable at the .01 level (r: -0.2273). 
Faculty who tended to be relatively dissatisfied with teaching in the 
community college tended to have more favorable attitudes toward col-
lective negotiations than did faculty who were more satisfied with 
community college teaching (See Table X). 
The degree level of faculty was significantly correlated with the 
dependent variable at the .05 level (r: .2004). Faculty with rela-
tively higher rank tended to have more favorable attitudes towards 
collective negotiations than did faculty with relatively lower pro-
fessional rank (See Table XI). 
The curriculum in which faculty were teaching was significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable at the .05 level (r: .01598). 
Faculty teaching in both vocational and transfer curriculum tended to 
have more favorable attitudes toward collective negotiations than did 
faculty teaching in college transfer or vocational-technical curric-
ulum (See Table XII). 
Summary 
This chapter presented the statistical analysis and findings of 
the data collected through the administration of the instruments 
described in Chapter III. The chapter deals in turn with a simple 
analysis of response. Patterns to the collective negotiations scale 
and each of the four hypotheses. The one-way analysis of variance 
test of significance was used to test the first and third hypotheses 
and a t-test for the second one. The fourth hypothesis was tested 
through a zero-order correlation coefficient test of significance. 
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TABLE X 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF FACULTY SCORES 
ON THE COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS SCALE BY 
TEACHING SATISFACTION 
Teaching Satisfaction N Means* Standard Deviation 
1. Very dissatisfied 4 140.250 33.460 
2. Dissatisfied 7 118. 285 26.843 
3. Indifferent 8 126.375 21.487 
4. Satisfied 88 118. 716 19.454 
5. Very Sa ti sfi ed 52 110.846 23.104 
N = 1 9 
*The higher mean scores indicate greater attitudes toward collective 
negotiations (maximum score = 180). 
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TABLE XI 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF FACULTY SCORES 
ON THE COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS SCALE BY 
PROFESSIONAL RANK 
Professional Rank N Means* Standard Deviation 
1. Less than A.A. 1 83.00 
2. A.A. 4 113. 500 26.451 
3. Bachelor 1 s degree 27 110. 704 15.864 
4. Master 1 s degree 101 117. 406 21.990 
5. Doctor 1 s degree 26 124.115 24.949 
N = 159 
*The higher mean scores indicate greater attitudes toward collective 
negotiations (maximum score = 180). 
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TABLE XII 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF FACULTY SCORES 
ON THE COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS SCALE BY 
TEACHING CURRICULUM 
Curriculum N Means* Standard Deviation 
College Transfer 
Vocational-Technical 
Both 
Other 
N = 15 
65 
34 
47 
13 
114. 584 
114. 676 
119.447 
126.923 
24.799 
17.354 
21.359 
17.708 
*The higher mean scores indicate greater attitudes toward collective 
negotiations (maximum score= 180). 
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Simple percentages were used for the analysis of responses to the 
collective negotiations scale. 
Faculty scores on the collective negotiations scale indiciated 
generally favorable attitudes toward the concept of collective nego-
tiations, but less favorable attitudes toward the use of sanctions 
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and withholding faculty services. Hypothesis one was found signifi-
cant at .01 level of confidence, there was a statistically significant 
difference toward collective negotiations for individuals classified 
as decisionally deprived, saturated, or at equilibrium. Hypothesis 
two was not found significant at the .05 level of confidence, there 
was no statistically significant relationships in attitudes toward 
collective negotiations between state supported and private community 
junior colleges. Hypothesis three was found significant at the .01 
level of confidence, there was statistically significant differences 
in attitudes toward collective negotiations among the selected indi-
vidual colleges. Hypothesis four was found significant at the .05 
level of confidence for three variables of political preference, 
teaching curriculum, and degree status, and it was found significant 
at the .01 level of confidence for teaching satisfaction with commun-
ity junior college. No correlation between age, sex, religion, tenure 
status, rank, and academic field and attitudes toward collective nego-
tiations was found. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary of the Study 
Over the past several years, collective negotiations has emerged 
as a major trend in higher educaion with the public two-year colleges 
as the pacesetters, far outnumbering four-year institutions in the use 
of collective negotiations on campus. Collective negotiations in 
public higher education is a relatively recent phenomenon, most of it 
encouraged by state legislation enacted in the past 10 to 15 years. 
Although literature concerning collective negotiations can be 
readily found in professional journals, most of this literature has 
been concerned with issues and problems in the collective negotiations 
process. Those studies completed have principally investigated demo-
graphic variables and attitudes toward collective negotiations. It 
appears that institutional variables that could influence faculty 
attitudes toward collective negotiations have largely been ignored. 
There seems to be two prominent points of view concerning the 
motivation of community junior college faculty to engage in collective 
negotiations in the literature. One view centers on the economic, or 
welfare motive, and maintains that community junior college faculty 
engage in collective negotiations primarily to increase their salaries 
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and benefits. The other view maintains that the primary reason com-
munity junior college faculty engage in collective negotiations is to 
increase their role in the governance or decision-making process of 
their college. 
The present study examined the latter of the motivational forces. 
Faculty attitudes toward collective negotiations should be signifi-
cantly related to their perceptions of their participation in academic 
decision-making. 
Restatment of the Problem 
The purpose of the present study was to: 
1. Collect information \'lhich might serve as an indication of the 
overall receptiveness of community junior college faculty toward the 
concept of collective negotiations. 
2. Investigate the relationship between the attitudes of commun-
ity junior college faculty and faculty members• perceptions of parti-
cipation in academic decision-making. 
3. Investigate the relationships between the attitudes of com-
munity junior college faculty and selected demographic and career 
variables of faculty members. 
Specifically, the following questions were raised for study: 
1. What are the attitudes of community junior college faculty 
toward collective negotiations? 
2. Is there a statistically significant relationship between a 
faculty member's attitudes toward collective negotiations and his 
perception of participation in academic decision-making? 
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3. Are there significant differences between state and locally 
governed community junior colleges with respect to faculty attitudes 
toward collective negotiations? 
4. Are there significant differences among the colleges surveyed 
in the assessed faculty attitudes toward collective negotiations? 
5. Are certain demographic and career variables of faculty mem-
bers, such as age, sex, religion, political preference, teaching cur-
riculum, academic field, tenure status, professional rank, satisfac-
tion with community junior college teaching, and degree, related to 
faculty attitudes toward collective negotiations? 
Subjects Participating in the Study 
Subjects involved in the study were 285 full-time community 
junior college faculty members in Arkansas, Missouri, North Dakota, 
and Oklahoma. Of the original 285 questi-0nnaires, 185 (65 percent) 
were returned. In this group·, 159 questionnaires (56 percent) were 
usable for the purpose of data analyses. 
Summary of the Findings 
Research Question One 
What is the general attitude orientation of community junior col-
lege faculty members toward collective negotiations? 
An analysis of the data collected from the administration of the 
collective negotiations scale indicate that the majority of community 
junior college faculty sampled have favorable attitudes toward the use 
of collective negotiations in higher education. There is considerable 
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consensus that faculty have the right to utilize sanctions, however, 
there is little favor expressed toward the various forms of sanctions, 
particularly withholding of services. Ninety-two percent of the fac-
ulty indicated that they should be able to organize freely and to bar-
gain collectively about the working conditions of employement. Only 
21 percent agreed that it was unwise to establish educational policies 
and practices through collective negotiations, and only 27 percent 
felt that collective negotiations is primarily a coerceive technique 
that will have detrimental effects on higher education. 
Null Hypothesis One 
There are no statistically significant differences toward collec-
tive negotiations for individuals classified as decisionally deprived, 
saturated, or at equilibrium. A one-way analysis of variance test of 
significance was computed on the mean CN Scale scores for each group 
of decisional participation. 
The analysis of variance test was significant at the .01 level. 
The null hypothesis was rejected. There is an inverse relationship 
between perceptions of faculty participation in academic decision-
making and attitudes toward collective negotiations. Faculty who are 
decisionally saturated tend to have less favorable attitudes toward 
collective negotiations, while faculty who are decisionally deprived 
tend to have highly favorable attitudes toward collective negotia-
tions. 
Null Hypothesis Two 
There are no statistically significant differences in attitudes 
toward collective negotiations between state supported and private 
community junior colleges. At-test was used to determine if statis-
tical significance could be found between the means of state supported 
and private community junior colleges. The analysis showed no statis-
tically significant differences in attitudes toward collective nego-
tiations between state supported and private community junior col-
leges. The null hypothesis was accepted. 
Null Hypothesis Three 
There are no statistically significant differences in attitudes 
toward collective negotiations among the selected individual colleges. 
A one-way analysis of variance test on the CN scale mean scores for 
the nine colleges was significant at the .01 level. The null hypoth-
esis was rejected. There is significant differences in attitudes 
toward collective negotiations among the nine individual colleges. 
Null Hypothesis Four 
There are no statistically significant relationships between the 
selected demographic and career characteristics of age, sex, religion, 
political preference, satisfaction with junior college teaching, 
tenure status, degree, rank, teaching curriculum, academic field, and 
faculty members• attitudes toward collective negotiations. Zero-order 
correlations were computed and null hypotheses were tested for statis-
tical significance at the .05 and .01 levels. 
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Findings pertaining to the relationship between the demographic 
and career variables and the dependent variables are as follows: 
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1. Political orientation was significantly correlated with the 
dependent variable (.05). Faculty who tended to be liberal in poli-
tical orientation had more favorable attitudes toward collective 
negotiations than did faculty who identified with a more conservative 
political orientation. 
2. Satisfaction with community college teaching was signifi-
cantly correlated with the dependent variable (.01). Faculty who were 
less satisfied tended to have more favorable attitudes toward collec-
tive negotiations than did faculty who were more satisfied with com-
munity college teaching. 
3. Teaching curriculum was significantly correlated with the 
dependent variable (.05). Faculty teaching in both vocational and 
transfer curriculum tended to have more favorable attitudes toward 
collective negotiations than did faculty teaching in college transfer 
or vocational-technical curriculum. 
4. Degree was significantly correlated with the dependent vari-
able (.05). Faculty with higher academic degrees tended to have more 
favorable attitudes toward collective negotiations than did faculty 
with lower degrees. 
5. The following demographic and career variables were not sig-
nificantly correlated with the dependent variables (.05), age, sex, 
religion, tenure status, rank, and academic field. 
Conclusions 
Six major conclusions can be derived from the findings of the 
present study: 
1. There is a moderately strong inverse relationship between 
community junior college faculty attitudes toward collective negotia-
tions and faculty perceptions of participation in academic decision-
making. The more participation in academic decision-making, as 
perceived by the faculty, the less likely they are to have attitudes 
in favor of collective negotiations. The converse is also true. Fac-
ulty who perceive less participation in academic governance tend to 
have more favorable attitudes toward collective negotiations. 
This finding appears compatible with the theory that the emerg-
ence of teacher militancy is related to the "professionalization'' of 
teachers. Inherent in the professional role are expectations for con-
siderable control over the conditions of employment and participation 
in institutional governance. In situations where these expectations 
are not fulfilled, faculty are likely to accept collective negotia-
tions as a means of acquiring a role in institutional decision-making. 
On the other hand, when faculty as individuals feel capable of influ-
encing institutional operations, they seem less attracted to collec-
tive negotiations. 
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2. The findings resulting from the testing of the first hypoth-
esis of this study tend to affirm March and Simon's theory of fonnal 
organizations related to the decision-making process. March and Simon 
postulated that when goals are not shared the decision process will be 
reached by predominantly bargaining proceses. This study has shown 
that those faculty having favorable attitudes toward collective nego-
tiations differ in their perceptions of participation in academic 
decision-making than faculty with unfavorable attitudes toward collec-
tive negotiations. 
3. There are no significant differences in faculty. attitudes 
toward collective negotiations between state governed and locally 
governed community junior colleges. This trend seems related to the 
types of governance of both types of institutions as the types of 
governance do not differ significantly for the two. That is, the 
majority of the faculty in both private and public institutions per-
ceived themselves as decisionally deprived. 
The majority of faculty on each community junior college campus 
seem to possess favorable attitudes toward collective negotiations. 
The only apparent exception to this is the trend for state governed 
community junior college faculty to possess more favorable attitudes 
toward collective bargaining than locally governed colleges. It seems 
conceivable, therefore, that state governed canmunity junior colleges 
could lead the way toward the use of collective negotiations if enab-
ling legislations were enacted in the states of Arkansas, Missouri, 
North Dakota, and Oklahoma. 
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4. Attitudes toward collective negotiations does not seem to be 
uniform among the nine individual colleges. Some of the campuses have 
more favorable attitudes toward collective negotiations than others. 
It can be concluded from the findings, in general, that significant 
differences exist in attitudes toward collective negotiations among 
colleges whose faculty members are mostly classified as decisionally 
deprived, saturated, or at equilibrium. 
In other words, colleges whose faculty members are mostly clas-
sified as decisionally saturated or at equilibrium tend to have less 
favorable attitudes toward collective negotiations than colleges whose 
faculty members are mostly classified as decisionally deprived. The 
same is true when comparing colleges whose faculty members are mostly 
classified as decisionally saturated or at equilibrium. 
An implication of the above is that a considerable shift in atti-
tudes toward collective negotiations could occur as more and more fac-
ulty share the same perception of how their institutions are being 
governed. If, for example, an institution with a predominance of 
faculty who perceived themselves as decisionally deprived were to 
systematically change governance practices to be more in line with 
decisionally saturated or at equilibrium, the result could conceivably 
be less favorable attitudes toward collective negotiations. 
5. The demographic and career characteristics of faculty, al-
though not of a substantial value as predictors of faculty attitudes 
toward collective negotiations, appear to be useful in describing fac-
ulty who were disposed to collective negotiations. Generally, these 
faculty members are liberal in their political preference, possess 
more advanced degrees, are more apt to be dissatisfied with community 
college teaching, and teaching predominantly in the college transfer 
and vocational-technical curriculum. 
6. Community junior college faculty members, based on those 
sampled in this study, generally seem to view collective faculty 
pressure as legitimate. It is likely that they will be receptive to 
faculty organization and collective negotiatons. 
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Recommendations for Further Research 
The findings of this research seem to indicate that certain 
institutional, personal, and demographic variables are related to the 
attitudes of community junior college faculty toward collective nego-
tiations. It now would be valuable to gather further data that would 
support or refute the generalizability of these relationships. There-
fore, the following recommendations for further research are made: 
1. The study should be replicated using different samples in 
other communty junior college systems in the United States. 
2. Parallel studies need to be made of other kinds of institu-
tions of higher education, such as four-year colleges and universi-
ties, in order to see if similar or different conditions exist among 
institutions of higher education. 
3. An indepth study of a single institution, perhaps employing 
interviewing techniques, might add further insight into the findings 
of the present study or suggest that other variables may be signifi-
cantly related to faculty attitudes toward collective negotiations. 
4. This study implies that the more democratic governance at 
an institution, the less propensity a faculty will have to utilize 
collective negotiations. Studies should be conducted to compare the 
faculty perceptions of their participation in academic governance and 
attitudes toward collective negotiations based on a variety of insti-
tutional governing patterns. Such studies could yield valuable infor-
mation concerning the effects of different types of governance on the 
collective negotiations process and faculty-administrative relation-
ships in general. 
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5. Since no statistically significant differences were found in 
attitudes toward collective negotiations between state governed and 
locally governed community junior colleges, additional research is 
needed to verify these findings. A study exploring this and other 
differences between the faculty of the two types of institutions could 
contribute significantly to our knowledge about institutional control 
and governance. 
6. Since no statistically significant relationships were found 
between demographic and career characteristics of age, sex, religion, 
tenure status, rank, and academic field, and faculty members' atti-
tudes toward collective negotiations, additional research is needed 
to verify these findings and to provide additional insight into the 
relationship between these variables. 
7. With statistically significant differences found in attitudes 
toward collective negotiations among the selected individual colleges, 
further research is needed to detennine the reason(s) for these dif-
ferences. 
8. This study implies that community college faculty members 
feel that the utilization of collective negotiations will increase the 
faculty's participation in academic governance of colleges. Research 
should be conducted to determine if a faculty does increase its role 
in institutional decision-making by utilizing collective negotiations. 
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Concluding Note 
Nothing is made clearer from the results of the study than the 
need for explicit statement of the relationship between unionization 
and collegiality with the literature of higher education. Existing 
studies almost all too frequently have taken a causal approach to 
explaining the relationship between unionization and less collegiality 
where the fonner causes the latter. However, from the results of the 
study it is clear that the latter can indeed cause the former - that 
is, a lack of collegiality can lead to unionization even though uion-
ization does not necessarily lead to less collegiality. Unionization 
can and should be utilized wherever necessa~ to augment and strengthen 
the faculty's role in collegial self-governance. 
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S. No. 
-----
Collective Negotiations Scale 
The statements listed below are intended to elicit your op1n1on 
on matters concerning Faculty-Governing Board relationships in com-
munity Junior Colleges. 
The following definitions are presented to assist you in respond-
ing to the statement below: 
Collective Negotiations: A generic term for the process in which fac-
ulty salaries and other conditions of employment are determined by 
agreement between representatives of a faculty organization and repre-
sentatives of the governing board. Under this term are included col-
lective bargaining and professional negotiations. 
Sanctions: A term applied to coercive acts of various kinds, varying 
in intensity from verbal warning to withholding services. Sanctions 
of all types are used to gain concessions from the employer. 
Strike: A severe form of sanction involving concerted work stoppage 
by employees. 
Faculty Organization: An organizati-0n representing the faculty in 
collective negotiations with the governing board in matters pertaining 
to salaries and other conditions of employment. 
Governing Board: Refers to the body legally responsible for the ope-
ration of the college. This may be a l-0cal or state level body. 
Please circle the response to the right of the statement which best 
describes your reaction to the statement. 
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
Very Strongly More Than More Than Strongly Very 
Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly 
AVS AS A D OS DVS 
Example: Faculty should receive higher salaries. AVS (@A D OS DVS 
1. I think collective negotiations is an 
effective way for faculty to partici-
pate in determining the conditions of 
their employment. 
2. I think collective negotiations is an 
effective way for faculty to limit 
the unilateral authority of the 
governing board. 
AVS AS A D OS DVS 
AVS AS A D OS DVS 
3. Faculty members should be able to with-
hold their services when satisfactory 
agreement between their organization 
and the governing board cannot be 
reached. 
4. Collective negotiations should if pos-
sible omit the threat of withholding 
services. 
5. Faculty members should be able to 
organize freely and to bargain col-
1 ectively in their working conditions. 
6. Faculty organizations at local, state 
and national levels should publicize 
unfair practices by a governing board 
through the media such as TV, radio, 
newspapers, and magazine. 
7. I feel that collective negotiations 
is primarily a coercive technique 
that will have detrimental effects 
on higher educaton. 
8. I feel that strikes on the part of 
faculty members are an undesirable· 
aspect of collective negotiations. 
9. I believe that militant faculty organ-
izations are made up of a large number 
of malcontents and misfits. 
10. Faculty members should not strike 
in order to enforce their demands. 
11. I feel that the good faculty mem-
bers can always get the salary they 
need without resorting to collective 
negotiations. 
12. I believe that collective bargaining, 
alias collective. negotiations, is 
beneath the dignity of college fac-
ulty members. 
13. I believe that strikes, sanctions, 
boycotts, mandated arbitration or 
mediation are improper procedures 
to be used by public community or 
junior college faculty who are dis-
satisfied with their conditions of 
employment. 
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AVS AS A 0 OS OVS 
AVS AS . A D OS DVS 
AVS AS A D OS OVS 
AVS AS A D OS DVS 
AVS AS A D OS DVS 
AVS AS A D OS DVS 
AVS AS A D OS OVS 
AVS AS A 0 OS OVS 
AVS AS A D OS OVS 
AVS AS A D OS DVS 
AVS AS A D DS OVS 
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14. I feel that a faculty member cannot 
withhold his services without vio-
lating professional ethics and trust. AVS AS A D DS DVS 
15. I feel that collective negotiations 
is an infringement on the authority 
of the governing board and should 
be resisted. AVS AS A D DS DVS 
16. I think collective negotiations is 
a good way to unite the teaching 
profession into a powerful politi-
cal body. AVS AS A D DS DVS 
17. I think that collectively negotiated 
written labor agreements place 
undesirable restrictions on the 
admin i strati on. AVS AS A D DS DVS 
18. I think collective negotiations can 
provide a vehicle whereby faculty 
members gain greater on-the-job 
dignity and independence in perform-
ing their functions. AVS AS A D OS DVS 
19. I believe that many leaders in the 
drive for collective negotiations 
are power seekers who do not have 
the best interests of education at 
heart. AVS AS A D DS DVS 
20. The 1 ocal faculty organization should 
seek to regulate standards for hiring 
of new faculty members. AVS AS A D DS DVS 
21. I think faculty members have a right 
to impose sanctions on governing 
boards under certain circumstances. AVS AS A D DS DVS 
22. I think that sanctions are a step 
forward in acceptance of faculty 
responsibility for self-discipline 
and for insistence upon conditions 
conducive to an effective program 
of education. AVS AS A D DS DVS 
23. I believe sanctions are a means of 
improving educational opportunities 
and eliminating conditions detri-
mental to professional service. AVS AS A D DS DVS 
24. I believe that censure by means of 
articles in professional association journals, special study reports, 
newspapers, or other mass media, is 
a legitimate technique for faculty 
use. 
25. I feel that the traditional position 
that faculty members, as public 
employees, may not strike is in the 
best interest of public higher 
education. 
26. I don't feel that the services of 
the faculty are so necessary to the 
public welfare as to necessitate 
the forfeiture of the right of 
faculty to strike. 
27. I believe that any faculty sanction 
or other coercive measure is com-
pletely unprofessional. 
28. I feel that it is unwise to estab-
lish educational policies and prac-
tices through collective negotiations. 
29. I believe that when the governing 
board denies the requests of the 
faculty, the faculty has a right 
to present the facts to the public 
and to their professional associates 
employed in other colleges. 
30. I think collective negotiations can 
bring greater order and system to 
education. 
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Decisional Participation Scale 
(Part I) 
Do you currentlx 
respond to all items. 
participate in the following decisions? Please 
Example: Development of Class Schedules vi. Yes 2. No 
1. Development of class schedules 1. Yes 2. No 
2. Development of catalog material 1. Yes 2. No 
3. Development of new courses 1. Yes 2. No 
4. Development of new curricula 1. Yes 2. No 
5. Ev al uat ion of new curricula 1. Yes 2. No 
6. Evaluation of current curricula 1. Yes 2. No 
7. Identifying needs for new faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
8. Making contacts for new faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
9. Interviewing prospective faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
10. Selection of new faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
11. Development of new faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
12. Evaluation of faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
13. Selection of faculty for promotion 1. Yes 2. No 
14. Selection of faculty for tenure 1. Yes 2. No 
15. Nonretention of faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
16. Developing private sources for projects 1. Yes 2. No 
17. Seeking federal funds 1. Yes 2. No 
18. Allocation of space 1. Yes 2. No 
19. Planning for new buildings 1. Yes 2. No 
20. Selection of departmental chairman 1. Yes 2. No 
21. Budget administration and control 1. Yes 2. No 
110 
Decisional Participation Scale 
{Part II) 
Do you desire to participate in the following decisions? Please 
respond to all items. 
Example: Al 1 ocatfon of Space v 1. Yes 2. No 
1. Development of class schedules 1. Yes 2. No 
2. Development of catalog material 1. Yes 2. No 
3. Development of new courses 1. Yes 2. No 
4. Development of new curricula 1. Yes 2. No 
5. Evaluation of new curricula 1. Yes 2. No 
6. Evaluation of current curricula 1. Yes 2. No 
7. Identifying needs for new faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
8. Making contacts for new faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
9. Interviewing prospective faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
10. Selection of new faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
11. Development of new faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
12. Evaluation of faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
13. Selection of faculty for promotion 1. Yes 2. No 
14. Selection of faculty for tenure 1. Yes 2. No 
15. Nonretention of faculty 1. Yes 2. No 
16. Developing private sources for projects 1. Yes 2. No 
17. Seeking federal funds 1. Yes 2. No 
18. Allocation of space 1. Yes 2. No 
19. Planning for new buildings 1. Yes 2. No 
20. Selection of departmental chairman 1. Yes 2. No 
21. Budget administration and control 1. Yes 2. No 
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Demographic and Career Information 
For each item please check ( v) the response which correctly 
describes you, or answer the question asked. Please respond to all 
i terns. 
Example: I enjoy college teaching ~l. Yes 2. No 
1. Are you a full-time employee at this Junior College? 
1. Yes 2. No 
2. Age: 
1. 20-24 years 5. 40-44 years 
2. 25-29 years 6. 45.,.49 years 
3. 30-34 years 7. 50 years or older 
4. 35-39 years 
3. Sex: 
1. Male 2. Female 
4. Religious Preference: 
1. Catholic 4. Other (State: 
2. Jewish 5. None 
3. Protestant 
5. Political Preference: 
1. Democrat 4. Socialist 
2. Independent 5. Other (State: 
3. Republican 
6. In which academic area do you teach? 
1. Vocational-Technical 5. Business Administration 
2. Humanities and Fine Arts 6. Natural Sciences 
3. Social Sciences 7. Other (State: 
4. Education 
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7. The major portion of the courses you teach apply to what part of 
the curriculum? 
1. College transfer 3. Both 
4. Other (State: 
----
2. Vocational-Technical 
8. Do you have tenure status? 
1. Yes 2. No 
9. Rank as of 1979-80 academic year: 
1. None, co 11 ege does not have academic rank 
2. Instructor 
3. Assistant Professor 
4. Associate Professor 
s. Professor 
6. Other (Please specify: 
10. Please check the expression below which best describes your 
present attitude toward community junior college teaching as 
a career. 
1. Very dissatisfied 
2. Dissatisfied 
3. Indifferent 
4. Satisfied 
5. Very Satisfied 
11. Highest earned degree: 
1. Less than A. A. 4. Master's degree 
2. A. A. s. Doctor 1 s degree 
3. Bachelor's degree 
Would you like to have a copy of the results of the study? 
1. Yes 2. No 
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OJ§[] 
Oklahoma State University 
I 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION I STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074 ROOM 309 GUNDERSEN HALL (405) 624-7244 AND HIGHER EDUCATION 
STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
November 15, 1980 
The purpose of this letter is to introduce myself, to explain my 
research project, and to request your cooperation and assistance. 
I am completing a doctoral program in Administration and Higher 
Education at Oklahoma State University. I have a deep interest in the 
educational purposes of the community junior colleges. Consequently, 
I have designed my doctoral research with a focus on useful appl i ca-
tion. 
Enclosed are copies of the instruments to be used in that effort. 
The purpose of this study is twofo 1 d: 
1) To gather data concerning the attitudes of junior college 
faculty toward the concept of collective negotiations; and 
2) To investigate the relationships between these assessed atti-
tudes and two other important variables: namely, faculty perception 
of participation in academic decision making, and selected demographic 
and career infonnation. 
In order to initiate my study, I will need a listing of all full-
time faculty employed by your institution for the 1980-81 academic 
year. I would appreciate receiving this listing at your earliest con-
venience. I propose to submit the research questionnaire directly to 
each faculty member who is selected to participate in the study, and 
to let him or her decide whether or not to complete the survey instru-
ment. No individual or college will be identified by name in report-
ing results of the study. Responses will be treated confidentially. 
In closing, may I express my appreciation to you for taking the 
time to read this letter. I look forward to hearing from you in the 
near future. 
Sincerely, 
Aliakbar Aminbeidokhti 
Dr. Carl R. Anderson, Thesis Adviser 
Other committee members: Dr. Robert R. Kamm 
Dr. Jacob D. Zucker 
Dr. Russel L. Dobson 
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OJ§[]] 
Oklahoma State University I STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74078 GUNDERSEN HALL (405) 624-6346 COLLEGE OF EDUCATION 
December 15, 1980 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
This is in reference to my letter dated November 15, 1980 wherein 
I tlad requested a list of names of al 1 ful 1-time faculty members em-
ployed by your institution for the 1980-81 academic year. I hope my 
request has received your favorable consideration as the responses of 
your faculty would help to enrich the quality of my doctoral research. 
I look forward to hearing from you in the matter as and when your 
busy schedule permits. Please disregard this letter if you have al-
ready taken action in the matter. 
Very sincerely yours, 
Aliakbar Aminbeidokhti 
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OJ§[] 
Oklahoma State University I STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74078 GUNDERSEN HALL (405) 624-6346 COLLEGE OF EDUCATION 
February 1, 1981 
Dear Educator: 
As a member of the academic community, you are aware of the need 
for additional research in the field of higher education. The en-
closed questionnaire is the basis of a doctoral study in an area in 
which there has been little empirical investigation. 
The purposes of this study are: 
1) to gather data concerning the attitudes of junior college 
faculty toward the concept of collective negotiations·, and 
2) to investigate the relationships between those assessed atti-
tudes and two other variables: namely, faculty perception of partici-
pation in academic decision making, and selected demographic and career 
information. 
The questionnaire, which should not take less than 15 minutes to 
complete, is coded for the sole purpose of expediting follow-up mail-
ings. Due to the sensitive nature of the questionnaire, we want to 
assure you that your response will be kept strictly confidential. 
Since other phases of the research cannot begin until an analysis 
of the questionnaires is concluded, we are asking you to please return 
the completed questionnaire within fifteen days. Enclosed please find 
a stamped, self-addressed envelope to help with the return. 
We believe the results of the study will have considerable value 
and are most willing to share the results with you if you so desire. 
Your cooperation is very much appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
Aliakbar Aminbeidokhti 
Carl R. Anderson, Thesis Adviser 
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[[]§[[] 
Oklahoma State University I STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74078 GUNDERSEN HALL (40S) 624-6346 COLLEGE OF EDUCATION 
February 16, 1981 
Dear Colleague: 
You were recently sent a questionnaire en titled 11 A Study of the 
Relationship Between Community Junior College Faculty Members' Percep-
tion of Their Participation in Academic Decision-Making and Attitude 
Toward Collective Negotiations" which is the basis of my doctoral 
thesis. 
As of this date I have not received your questionnaire. Your 
help is imperative in the success of my study. I will sincerely 
appreciate your taking a few minutes to complete and return the 
questionnaire. If you have already mailed your response, please 
accept my thanks for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Aliakbar Aminbeidokhti 
~ 
VITA 
Aliakbar Aminbeidokhti 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Education 
Thesis: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITY JUNIOR COLLEGE 
FACULTY MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN 
ACADEMIC DECISION-MAKING AND ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE 
NE GO TIA TIO NS 
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